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WAGE DISCRIMINATION AND THE
"COMPARABLE WORTH" THEORY IN
PERSPECTIVE 1
Bruce A. Nelson*
Edward M. Opton, Jr.**
Thomas E. Wilson***
INTRODUCTION

Men and women often do different jobs: most carpenters, physicians, and police officers are male; most secretaries, nurses,
and telephone operators are female. Despite substantial progress
in the desegregation of the workplace2 vocational choices and vocational opportunities are still very much affected by factors
linked to sex and race. 3 In the economic marketplace, most
traditional "women's" jobs pay less than "men's" jobs.
In a'recent issue of this Journal, Professor Ruth G. Blumrosen
has argued that the wage marketplace is infected with sex and
race discrimination.' The type of discrimination that she alleges
is the same as that addressed by the "equal worth" or "compara* B.B.A., 1965; J.D., 1968, University of Michigan .
. ** B.A., 1957, Yale University; Ph.D., 1964, Duke University; J.D., 1977, University of
California, Berkeley (Boalt Hall).
*** B.A., 1972, Stanford University; M.A., 1976, University of California, Davis; J.D.,
1976, Stanford University.
The authors are affiliated with the law firm of Morrison & Foerster, San Francisco,
California.
' This article responds to,Blumrosen, Wage Discrimination, Job Segregation, and Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 12 U. MICH. J. L. REr. 397 (1979).
• Between 1950 and 1976, the proportion of female lawyers and judges rose from 4.1%
to 9.2%, an increase of 124%. The corresponding increases for some other occupations
were: accountants, 81%; engineers, 50%; physicians and osteopaths, 97%; college and university teachers and presidents, 37%; bank officials and financial managers, 111%; buyers
and purchasing agents, 152%. U.S. BUREAU or LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR, U.S.
WORKING WOMEN: A DATABOOK 9, Table 8 (1977) [hereinafter cited as WORKING WOMEN).
See also note 255 infra; H. NORTHRUP & J. LARSON, THE IMPACT OF THE AT&T-EEO CONSENT DECREE (1979) (extensive progress in desegregating jobs in telephone industry under
consent decree); Hedges & Bemis, Sex Stereotyping: Its Decline in Skilled Trades,
MONTHLY LAB. REv., May 1974, at 14-22. But see WORKING WOMEN, supra, at 34-35, Tables 35-37 (women's earnings substantially lower than men's in all fields; little change
· during years 1955-1976).
' See Wage Discrimination, supra note 1, at 400 n.3.
' See note 1 supra. Note the distinction between Wage Discrimination, a short form of
citation to Professor Blumrosen's article, and "wage discrimination," that article's central concept.
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ble worth" movement. 5 Professor Blumrosen prescribes a judicial
remedy: the courts should appraise the worth of jobs and should
compel employers to pay wages proportional to such "worth."
The issue is not merely academic. Professor Blumrosen is a
prominent consultant to the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC). Her thesis will no doubt strike a sympathetic chord with the Chair of that agency, Eleanor Holmes Norton, who foresees the "equal worth" question as ''the women's
issue of the 1980's."8 It is, in Norton's view, "the same kind of
outsized issue [as] school desegregation" and the "most difficult
issue to arise under Title Vll." 7
The EEOC and other plaintiffs have litigated "comparabie
worth" several times, and although the theory has lost consist.ently,8 the EEOC has not given up. It continues to maintain that
"comparable worth" is the law, even though the courts do not
agree. 9 The agency has commissioned a major study by the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) on the feasibility of a biasfree job evaluation system, the development of which would be
prerequisite to large-scale enforcement of the "comparable
worth" theory. 10 The EEOC's counterpart in the Department of
• Professor Blumrosen's wage discrimination theory addresses the same discrimination
issues as the slogans "equal pay for jobs of equal worth" and "equal pay for jobs of
comparable worth." See, e.g., Lewin, The "Pink Collar" Revolution, NAT. L.J., Dec. 10,
1979, at 1, col. 1; Crystal, Comparable Worth?, Wall St. J., Nov. 5, 1979, at 24, col. 3;
Address by Alexis Herman, Director, Women's Bureau, Dep't of Labor, at Organizing
Conference of Coalition of Labor Union Women (Washington, Jan. 24, 1980), reprinted in
DAILY LAB. REP. (BNAi, No. 17, at E-1 (Jan. 24, 1980). Courts rejecting the equal worth
or comparable worth approach to wage discrimination under Title VII include: Christensen v. Iowa, 563 F.2d 353 (8th Cir. 1977); IUE v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 19 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. 450 (D.N.J. 1979), appeal pending, Nos. 79-1893 and 79-1894 (3d Cir.);
Lemons v. City & County of Denver, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), No. 81, at D-1 (10th Cir.
April 24, 1980). The slogans, however, greatly understate the proponents' demands.
"Equal worth" proponents are asking not only for equal pay for jobs equal in "worth," btit
also for wage increases for "female" jobs that, they admit, are worth less than the comparison "male" jobs, but which, they assert, are "worth" a greater proportion of the "male"
jobs' wage than they are paid. See, e.g., Wage Discrimination, supra note 1, at 400
& 490-501, especially the hypothetical example at 496-97. This article will use the term
"comparable worth theory" to refer to the comparable worth idea as well as its synonym,
the equal worth idea. However, "proportionate worth theory" would be a more accurate
label.
• DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), No. 211, at A-2 (Oct. 30, 1979) (paraphrase of Chair Norton's
remarks at Conference on Pay Equity, Washington, D.C., October 23, 1979)_1 Id.
• See cases cited in notes 4 supra and 206 & 212 and accompanying text infra.
• See, e.g., Address by EEOC Commissioner J. Clay Smith, Biennial Conference on
Civil Rights of Ohio AFL-CIO (Feb. 6, 1980), reprinted in DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), No. 28,
at E-2 (Feb. 8, 1980). See also Remarks of Daniel G. Leach, Vice Chair of the EEOC, to
the Federal Bar Association (Washington, D.C., June 9, 1978), excerpted in EMPL. PRAC.
GumE (CCH) 1 5070 (July 6, 1978).
,. NATIONAL RESEARCH CouNCn/NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, JOB EVALUATION: AN
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Labor, the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs
(OFCCP), has included "comparable worth" in its recent Federal Contract Compliance Manual. 11 Thus, in the view of the federal government's equal employment opportunity agencies, proportionate pay for jobs of proportionate worth is an idea whose
time is coming, if it has not already arrived. 12
The EEOC's commissioning of the NAS study is an attempt to
provide a scientific foundation for "comparable worth." 13 Professor Blumrosen's article is a parallel effort to construct a legal
foundation for court appraisal of "worth." Her article argues
forcefully that, when jobs are substantially segregated by sex or
race, Title VII should be construed to require pay in proportion
to the "worth" of jobs.
We will endeavor to show that Professor Blumrosen's article is
selective and oversimplified in its "historical, anthropological,
sociological and economic" 14 analysis. As a result, she has been
misled to the conclusion that courts should in effect take judicial
notice of "wage discrimination," which is a novel and controversial concept. Her article assumes, incorrectly, that wage discrimination is a proven and measurable statistic. The present article
considers the legal argument that wage discrimination is prohibANALYTIC REVIEW (Interim Report to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission)
(1979) [hereinafter cited as NAS REPORT). The reasons why. a bias-free job evaluation
system would be necessary are analyzed in part Il B infra.
II OFFICE OF FEDERAL CONTRACT COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS, FEDERAL CONTRACT COMPLIANCE
MANUAL § 2-250.2c (1979). The OFCCP also uses the term "wage discrimination," but
not in the context of comparable worth theory. As the OFCCP defines wage discrimination, it is a concept different from anything discussed in Professor Blumrosen's article or
in the present article. Id. at § 7-30.4.
12
Some additional developments also portend increased efforts to implement the comparable worth theory. In Connecticut, the legislature has mandated a pilot study of comparable worth theory in setting wages for state employees. The AFL-CIO recently decided
to support the comparable worth theory. Bus. WEEK, Dec. 17, 1979, at 66-69. In Canada,
the Legislative Assembly of the Province of Ontario has a comparable worth statute
under consideration as of January 1980. The proposed legislation would amend Chapter
112 of The Employment Standards Act, 1974, § 33, to read: "No employer . . . shall . . .
establish . . . any difference in wages paid to a male and to a female employee employed
in the same establishment who are performing work of equal value . . . . "Value would
be defined as a "composite" of skill, effort, responsibility, and working conditions. Id.
And the Congress has taken a first step towards adoption of equal worth theory in the
Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1111 (1978) (codified at 5
U.S.C~A. § 230l(b)(3) (West Supp. 1979)). Section 2301(b)(3) provides: "[E)qual pay
should be provided for work of equal value with appropriate consideration of both national and local rates paid by employers in the private sector . . . . " This ambiguous
language seems to indicate that Congress is not ready to abandon the market as the
measure of appropriate pay for civil service jobs, yet Congress is concerned about possible
wage discrimination in the marketplace.
,. NAS REPORT, supra note 10, at xi.
" Wage Discrimination, supra note 1, at 401-02.
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ited by Title VII.
Our article focuses primarily on one legal question: Does the
wage discrimination theory, as sketched by Professor Blumrosen,
fall within the remedial ambit of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act? Wage Discrimination's factual contentions as to the existence and universality of wage discrimination deserve equally
detailed analysis, but we leave that task to scholars of the pertinent disciplines, sociology and economics. We will deal with the
factual contentions of Wage Discrimination only so far as necessary to challenge its central factual conclusion: that a demonstration of job separation should lead to a judicial inference of
wage discrimination. This assertion is crucial to Professor Blumrosen's argument because it is the basis for the proposal that incumbents of sex- or race-separated jobs are entitled, by virtue of
their jobs alone, to higher wages. 15 Because her social science evidence is unpersuasive and her legal analysis is unsound, we conclude that the courts and the Congress have been wise in refraining from attempts to impose the "comparable worth" theory
15

This article will limit its discussion to sex discrimination. Because our discussion
applies equally to race and sex, it would be redundant to mention both protected groups
on every occasion. Moreover, notwithstanding Professor Blumrosen's conscientious inclusion of the word "blacks" to balance each mention of women, it appears that the primary
aim of the EEOC's focus on residual wage differentials is to raise the wages of women
and not of minority men. The "comparable worth" theory applies only when jobs are .
female-intensive or minority-intensive, and the extent of job segregation is much greater
for sex than for race. The EEOC's commissioned NAS REPORT, which is extensively cited
in Wage Discrimination, explicitly ignores race discrimination, stating as the rationale
for the omission that "[c]urrent public concern is almost entirely focused on sex-based
discrimination." NAS REPORT, supra note 10, at xii. Whatever the EEOC's intf>ntions
may be, one should not lose sight of the fact that in practice Professor Blumrosen's theories very probably would benefit white women at the expense of men, particularly blacks
and other minorities. The sole empirical study of a large-scale, judicially-mandated effort
to end job separation reported that the promotions and new hires opened up by the
AT&T consent decree went mostly to white women. H. NORTHRUP & J. LARSON, supra
note 2, at 48, 52-54, 77, 83-99. The relative losses by minority males occurred even though
eligibility for the AT&T consent decree remedies did not require minority men to show
that they worked in jobs that were seventy to eighty percent filled by minorities. Professor Blumrosen's wage discrimination theory, which would impose such eligibility limits
on minority men, would be even more likely to subject them to relative losses of income.
Estelle James has performed extensive statistical analyses on national data to predict
which groups would gain and which would lose income if men's and women's employment were "integrated." She found that college-educated white women would gain the
most, and college-educated black women would gain the least. Relative wage losses to
men would be eight to eighteen percent, with poorly educated white men losing the most,
and poorly educated black men also suffering large losses. These relative gains and losses
are all based on the assumption that higher wages for women would not attract more
women into the labor market. If, as seems likely, more women did enter the labor market, the relative gains and losses would be greater. James, Income and Employment Effects of Women's Liberation, in SEX, D1scR1MINATION, AND THE DIVISION or LABOR 379, 38491 (C. Lloyd ed. 1975).
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on the American economy.
Before we examine the "comparable worth" theory, Professor
Blumrosen's central concept must be defined and more accurately labeled. What she- calls "wage discrimination" is the idea
at the heart of her arguments, but she has used the term ambiguously. On the one hand, her idea of wage discrimination seems
to be 16 the earnings difference between sexes and races attributable to the concentration of women and blacks in lower paying
jobs. "[T]he low rates of pay associated with such· segregated
jobs constitute the major explanation for the 'earnings gap' between minority and female workers . . . and white males. This
gap has long been considered a major benchmark . . . of employment discrimination. " 17 If wage discrimination is merely the
wage difference between jobs usually held by women and jobs
usually held by men, it surely exists, 18 but it is not thereby illegal. This first definition of "wage discrimination" is consistent
with the possibility that jobs are, on the average, paid what they
are "worth." 19
But Professor Blumrosen relies in large part on a different
idea. Wage discrimination, she writes, means "rates paid for traditionally segregated jobs [which are] discriminatorily depressed."20 Under this definition, wage discrimination means
lower pay for traditionally "female" jobs based on the sex of the
incumbents, and not because the job is "worth" less than a job
performed by a male. Such practices would come closer to the
proscriptions of Title VIl, were it not for the Bennett Amendment, 21 whose effect we dispute with Professor Blumrosen. But it
is by .no means certain that wage discrimination in this sense
occurs to any important extent.
The double-barreled term "wage discrimination" is unsatisfactory for another reason as well. The term is a very close paraphrase of the language of Title VII, which forbids employers "to
discriminate . . . with respect to . . . compensation" between
sexes and races. 22 The term "wage discrimination" thus begs the
" The concept of wage discrimination "seems to be" rather than "is" because it is
never defined explicitly. Our discussion of its ambiguity is based on the meanings implicit throughout the text of Wage Discrimination, especially at 399-401.
" Wage Discrimination, supra note 1, at 400.
" Id. at 410-15.
" "Worth" must be set within quotation marks because, as is explained below at part I
B, the worth of a job is a concept that has meaning only in reference to the very standards that Professor Blumrosen rejects.
,. Wage Discrimination, supra note 1, at 401.
" 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1976). See part Il infra for an analysis of the effect of the
Bennett Amendment on Title VII.
22
Pub. L. ·No. 88-352, §§ 701-716, 78 Stat. 253 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-
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question, for it supplies an affirmative answer to the central
question of the entire argument: whether low wages result from
illegal discrimination.
This article therefore will employ more exact terms, as the following Figure 1 shows:
FIGURE

1

Wage
Differential

EMPIRICALLY DEMONSTRATED
BY

MULTIP LE

b

Known Measured
Non-Discriminatory
Factors

C

REGRESSION STUDIES

Residual Wage
Differential

THEORirrlCALDEMONSTRABLE BY

NOT

STATISTICAL

Non-Discriminatory Factors

ANALYSIS

cr ___ _t_ _____ ,
1-:,.J Wage Discrimination

Job Segregation
(by employers}

I

f'equal worthy," "comparablet
L ____ worh")____ f

g· Unequal Pay for
Equal Work
(covered by EPA>

r _____ .J_______ 7
____ i ____ 7

~
L----------~

Unequal Pay For
I
Work of Equal "Worth" I

,.,-----L---,
~ Pay Disproportionate

I
L

I

to "Worth" of Work I
--------~

Dissection of Wage Differentals
a= b+c
c = d +e
e = f+g+g'
g = h+i

15 (1976)). The act provides in pertinent part:
§ 703(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice fo~ an employer-(1) to fail
or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex or
national origin . . . .
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"Wage differential" ([a] in Figure 1) is the gross difference in
wages between jobs traditionally filled by men and women.
Econometric studies divide the wage differential into two components. One component is the sum of all known and measured
non-discriminatory factors ([b] in Figure 1); the other is the
"residual wage differential" ([c] in Figure 1). This two-component dissection is as far as most statistical analyses are able to
go. Residual wage differentials are in theory subdividable into
discriminatory and nondiscriminatory factors. The non-discriminatory factors are those that are unknown, or that are known but
impractical to measure ([d] in Figure 1). 23 The discriminatory
factors are the effects of job segregation by employers24 ([f] in
Figure 1) and wage discrimination ( [g] and [g'] in Figure 1).
To the extent (if any) that "women's" work is paid less than
"men's" work in amount disproportionate to differences in "true
worth," wage discrimination occurs ( [g] and [g'] in Figure 1). 25
One form of wage discrimination is unequal pay for equal, i.e.,
identical or very similar, work ( [g'] in Figure 1). This special
case is the target, and the only target, of the Equal Pay Act of
1963 (EPA). 28 Wage discrimination that does not involve identi" Probably the most important of the unmeasurable nondiscriminatory factors is employee choice, i.e., women choosing occupations that are "worth" less and paid proportionately less than occupations chosen by men. As a practical matter, it is impossible to
assess the extent to which job segregation is a consequence of discriminatory job assignment by employers ([fl in Figure 1), and the extent to which it is a consequence of employee choice. Of course, vocational choices are themselves products of an entire cultural
milieu, which may itself be discriminatory. This article, however, concerns the type of
discrimination prohibited by Title VII and by the Equal Pay Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 8838, 77 Stat. 56 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(l) (1976)1 [hereinafter cited as EPA). That
is, it concerns discrimination by employers. Discrimination by the total cultural milieu is
not "discriminatory" within the meaning of the Jaw, so it falls within section [d I of Figure 1.
" Hereinafter "job segregation" will mean "job segregation by employers" unless otherwise specified. See note 23 supra and note 45 infra.
Note the distinction between discrimination due to job segregation and wage discrimination. A woman discriminatorily assigned to a low status job that is paid in proportion
to its true "worth" suffers only discrimination due to job segregation. If she is non-discriminatorily assigned to a job that is paid less in proportion to its true "worth" than
"men's" jobs are paid, she suffers only wage discrimination. If she is discriminatorily
assigned to a job whose true "worth" is less than that of the job she would have obtained
in the absence of discrimination, and the wage for her job is less in proportion to its
"worth" than the wage for "men's" jobs, then she suffers both from job segregation and
from wage discrimination .
.. This definition is the idea intended by Professor Blumrosen's definition quoted in
the text accompanying note 20 supra.
" See note 23 supra. The EPA provides in part:
No employer having employees subject to any provision of this section shall discriminate, within any establishment in which such employees are employed, between employees on the basis of sex by paying wages to employees in such establishment at a rate less than the rate at which he pays wages to employees of the
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cal male and female jobs is the object of "equal worth" or "comparable worth" theory ([g] in Figure 1). It may consist of unequal pay for different jobs that are equal in "worth" ( [h] in Figure
1), or it may consist of pay that is disproportionately unequal to
differences in true job worth, e.g., a male is paid one hundred
percent more than a woman for a job that is alleged to be "worth"
only fifty percent more ( [i] in Figure 1).
Although Wage Discrimination is a long article, its argument
may be summarized simply. First, Wage Discrimination points
out that women and blacks work mainly in certain sectors of the
economy. 27 Jobs filled by women and blacks tend to be low-wage
jobs, and according to the article, the low wages cannot entirely
be explained as the result of the several legitimate reasons for
lower pay that are known to be associated with women and black
workers. 28 Women's work, it is said, has always and everywhere
been devalued, and the devaluation has resulted in lower wage
rates for women and blacks than for white men. 29 The exclusion
of women from "men's" jobs - "job segregation" - has been so
intimately linked to discriminatory devaluation of women's work
that, the author states, the two are really one and the same:
Thus, job segregation has an integral characteristic, the
assignment of lower values to the jobs which are available
to · minorities and women than would otherwise be the
case. This evidence establishes that it is more likely than
not that where job segregation exists, the wages of those
jobs assigned to minorities and women have been depressed by virtue of the fact of their minority or female
status. 30
opposite sex in such establishment for equal work on jobs the performance of
which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed
under similar working conditions, except where such payment is made pursuant
to (i) a seniority system; (ii) a merit system; (iii) a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of production; or (iv) a differential based on any
other factor other than sex: Provided, That an employer who is paying a wage
rate differential in violation of this subsection shall not, in order to comply with
the provisions of this subsection, reduce the wage rate of any employee.
29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(ll (1976).
27
Wage Discrimination, supra note 1, at 402-10.
20 Id. at 410-15. The legitimate reasons that account for at least part of the sex differentials in wages and earnings are the lesser overtime worked by women, the more frequent employment of women on a part-time basis, the different kinds of training, education and counseling acquired by women, and the lesser work experience of the average
woman worker. Id. at 414.
21
Id. at 415-28.
'° Id. at 427-28.
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Wage Discrimination then sets forth a theory of the means by
which employers allegedly translate their devaluation of the
work of women and minorities into low wages. 31 Employers set
wages by two principal standards: internal comparison of the
"worth" of each job as compared to other jobs within the enterprise, and external comparison with the job market. Neither
standard is immune from discrimination. Internal comparisons
necessarily are subjective, and if those who set the wages devalue
the work of women, their judgments will reflect their prejudices.
Setting wages by rates prevailing in the external job market imports whatever collective stereotypes and prejudices infect the
economy as a whole. Wage Discrimination acknowledges that in
classical economic theory the job market values each job at its
true worth to the employer, but the article criticizes the classical
theory as outmoded. 32
In a brief but very important section, Wage Discrimination
summarizes eight published and unpublished econometric studies of sex and race differentials in wages. 33 By a statistical technique known as multiple regression analysis, 34 the authors of
these studies were able to account for zero percent to fifty-five
percent of the gross wage differentials between sexes and races. 35
The remaining wage differentials, which the present article
terms the residual wage differentials, have not evaporated under
the spotlight of multiple regression analysis. Wage Discrimination assumes that these residual wage differentials must be the
fruits of illegal discrimination and contends that wage discrimination must be presumed to exist whenever jobs are occupied
largely by members of one sex and/or race. This article will show.
that the assumption is mistaken and that the contention therefore fails.
Part II of Professor Blumrosen's article is devoted to argu•• Id. at 428-57.
32 Id. at 445-54. In classical economic theory, the job market awards wages to each job
according to its true worth, which is proportional to the value of the contribution of workers doing each job to the enterprise as a whole. If an employer offers less than the "true"
value, competitors will outbid it for the available workers; if it offers more than the true
value, the enterprise will lose money and become insolvent. The criticisms of this socalled "invisible hand" all argue that, although the "law of supply and demand" may
prevail in the aggregate and in the long run, it is subject to local perturbations and imperfections, including those resulting from imperfect competition (monopoly, oligopoly,
monopsony) and from prejudice, stereotype, and custom. Wage Discrimination's extended review of economic theory supports only a single contention: that the market
value of a job may be more or less than its "true" economic worth.
33
Id. at 454-56.
"' See text accompanying note 85 infra.
35
Wage Discrimination, supra note 1, at 456, Table 1.
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ments that residual wage differentials are prohibited by Title
VIl 38 and that this prohibition is not restricted by the Bennett
Amendment, 37 a statutory provision that many courts have interpreted as limiting wage discrimination claims brought under Title VII to the scope of the Equal Pay Act. 38 Her theory would not
require a plaintiff doing a traditional "women's" job to show
that she was paid less than she rightfully should have been
paid. 39 The plaintiff would have to show only that her job was
"segregated," i.e., that more than seventy or eighty percent of
the incumbents were female or minority. 40 In such cases, the
workers would be entitled to an injunction41 raising their pay unless the employer could prove that it would pay no more for the
job if the employees were male. "Evidence of segregated jobs,"
Professor Blumrosen asserts, "justifies an inference of discrimination in compensation." 42
Finally, Wage Discrimination considers the problem of remedies. The article recognizes that the amount of the residual wage
differential may be indeterminate in any particular instance, but
it argues that the courts should provide a remedy anyway. 43 If
the exact amount cannot be specified, the courts can apply general principles, especially the alleged findings of economists that
"[f]rom 20% to 50% of the wage differential between men and
women has been attributed to factors which cannot be justified
on grounds unrelated to discrimination." 44 Alternatively, the
court could require the use of a "reformed" job evaluation system to rewrite the employer's wage and salary structure. 45 The
present article will argue that such remedies would be grossly
,. Id. at 457-501.
37
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1976).
"' See cases cited in notes 175-76 infra.
,. Wage Discrimination, supra note 1, at 457-59, 466.
•• Id. at 461.
" Id. at 490.
" Id. at 465.
" Id. at 495-98.
" Id. at 497 (footnote omitted). See also id. at 500. The earnings of women in 1973
were about fifty-seven percent of men's earnings, id. at 410 n.52, so an injunction to
eliminate the twenty to fifty percent of the differential that Professor Blumrosen attributes to discrimination would mean pay raises of fifteen to thirty-eight percent (((100-57)
X .2) + 57 = 15%; ((100-57) X .5) + 57 = 37.7%).
" Id. at 494. We use the term "separation" rather than Professor Blumrosen's term
"segregation" because we reserve the latter term to describe discriminatory actions by
employers. Male-intensive and female-intensive jobs also can occur as the result·of applicant choice, even in the face of substantial efforts by employers to integrate the work
force. As we shall use the terms, job separation-the existence of female-intensive
jobs-includes the effects both of applicant choices and of discriminatory actions by employers. We will use the term "segregation" to refer only to employer actions. See notes
23-24 supra.

WINTER

1980)

"Comparable Worth"

243

unfair and impracticable, and would cause a drastic and undesirable upheaval in the American economy.
I.

THE EXISTENCE OF WAGE OISCRIMINATION

The component of residual wage differentials that Professor
Blumrosen calls "wage discrimination" is a concept far removed
from such everyday facts as "wages" or "hours of work." It is a
theoretical idea rather like Adam Smith's "invisible hand," 46 like
the inevitability of socialism in Marxist theory, 47 and like
Keynes' multiplier value of government expenditures: 48 that is,
residual wage differential is an inference based on the application of multi-layered, complex and co~troversial theory to a
broad range of facts. Wage Discrimination asserts that residual
wage differentials are so conclusively established and so universal that the courts are forced, as a practical matter, to order
wage increases for all jobs in which women or minorities are concentrated, for the presumption of discrimination is, in effect, irrebuttable.49 Wage Discrimination would lift the burden of proving discriminatory· wage differentials from plaintiffs and place on
employers the burden of proving the negative. For example, an
electrical contractor paying craft workers (mostly male electricians) more than clerical workers (mostly female clerks and
bookkeepers) would be presumed to be discriminating against
the clerical workers unless the employer could demonstrate that
no part of the wage differential was attributable to discrimination. The contractor could cite neither traditional job evaluation
'
" A, SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS Book IV, ch. II (1776). See P. SAMUELSON, EcoNOMICS 728-29, 840-41 (10th ed. 1976).
" K. MARX, DAS KAPITAL (1867, 1885, 1894). See generally J. RoBINSON, EssAY ON
MARXISM 954 n.15 (London 1942, 1964); P. SAMUELSON, supra note 46, at 865,
"J. KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST AND MONEY (1936). See
P. SAMUELSON, supra note 46, at 244.
11
Wage Discrimination's argument is as follows: (1) Sex and race discrimination has
existed and still exists. (2) One form of discrimination is job segregation, for example,
hiring all male crafts workers and all female clerks. (3) Another form of discrimination is
wage discrimination, that is, paying less for jobs performed by women or minorities than
would be paid if those jobs were performed by white men. (4) Because job segregation is
still quite prevalent, it is likely that wage discrimination is also still the rule rather than
the exception. (5) The statistical technique of multiple regression analysis can identify
wage differences attributable to legitimate factors such as education and experience; the
remaining, unexplained statistical variance-residual wage differential-must be attributable to wage discrimination. (6) Econometric studies have demonstrated residual wage
differentials. (7) Therefore, to make a prima facie case of wage discrimination, a plaintiff
should have to show only that she or he works in a job category occupied mainly by
women or minorities.
However, the prima facie case is irrebuttable as a practical matter. See part m A 1

infra.
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studies nor prevailing wages in the marketplace in its defense,
because both are allegedly infected with discrimination. 50 Professor Blumrosen boldly asserts that wage discrimination is so universally pervasive and proven as to warrant shifting the burden
of proof, mandating a decision for the employee unless the employer can prove the negative. The employer's burden, as we will
show below, would be an impossible one. But the structure of
theory and fact upon which the claim is asserted to rest will not
bear its weight.

A.

The Inadequacy of Wage Discrimination's Facts and
Analysis

In Section I, 51 Wage Discrimination cites statistics that show
that jobs are to a very considerable degree still separated, i.e.,
women are employed - by choice or compulsion - in different
jobs from men, and most women's jobs pay less. This is indisputable, but it tells us nothing about why most women's jobs
pay less. Among the several possibilities are (1) most women
choose jobs that are "worth" less than most "men's" jobs; and
(2) women are often discriminatorily assigned to jobs that are
"worth" less than most men's jobs. 52 Wage Discrimination does
not attempt to choose among the possibilities.
Part I B 53 is entitled "Links Between Job Segregation and
Wage Discrimination," but the reader finds therein nothing on
"links": no examples of linkage and no theory of linkage. Rather,
part I B consists of three independent subsections.
Subsection 1, 54 "The Findings of Social Sciences and Empirical Studies," summarizes sociological and anthropological evidence that invidious stereotypes of women and "women's work"
are widespread in Western and other cultures. Such stereotypes
are probably a necessary precondition of wage discrimination,
but the existence of sexual prejudice hardly establishes "links"
between job separation and wage discrimination. Proof of linkage
is crucial to Wage Discrimination's argument, for the article proposes that occurrence of female-intensive work raises a legal presumption of wage discrimination. In this subsection, Wage Dis'°

Wage Discrimination, supra note 1, at 429-41, 445-46.
" Id. at 402-15.
02 We agree with Wage Discrimination that jobs which are unequal in "worth" should
be paid unequally. We also agree with Wage Discrimination that if women are consigned
to jobs of less worth because of their sex, they have a legal right to promotion under Title

VII.
Id. at 415-28.
" Id. at 415-20.
53
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crimination cites not only scholarly studies, but also political
documents 55 and a work of popular polemics. 56 Yet the subsection
only asserts - without establishing or citing any authority that
purports to establish - a linkage between female-intensive jobs
and wage discrimination. We have made our own search for
linkage between job separation and wage discrimination; such
evidence as we have found indicates an absence of linkage.57
Subsection 2, 58 "The Persistence of Stereotypes," reiterates
that sex stereotypes do exist and are persistent. This subsection
deals with quite global beliefs such as the belief that "a woman's
primary commitment is to her family. " 59 But demonstration that
such beliefs exist, even that they are widespread among both
men and women, is logically far removed from the proposition to
be proved: that female-intensive jobs are ipso facto underpaid
jobs, that is, that job separation and wage discrimination are
linked. 80
.. See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE, EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY AND TREATMENT
FOR WOMEN WORKERS, REPORT VIlI (Int'! Labour Conference, 60th Sess., 1975), cited in
Wage Discrimination, supra note 1, at 417 n.88.
11 K. MILLETT, SEXUAL POLITICS (1970), cited in Wage Discrimination, supra note 1, at
416 n.86. See also id. at 420 n.99.
17 Professional sports is one of the very few types of employment in which available
statistics permit independent estimates of job segregation and wage discrimination. The
economists Pascal and Rapping have applied an exceptionally elaborate multiple regression analysis to the statistics of major league baseball performance, salary, and race.
They found strong evidence of job segregation, both as to entry into the major leagues
(some qualified minority players were still excluded) and as to job assignment (e.g., fiftythree percent of outfielders but only nine percent of pitchers were black). But job segregation was not linked to wage discrimination. Pascal and Rapping found no evidence of
wage discrimination. Black players, on the average, earned more than whites and were
more valuable players as measured by hits, runs, and other pertinent categories. Pascal
& Rapping, The Economics of Racial Discrimination in Organized Baseball, in RACIAL
DISCRIMINATION IN ECONOMIC LIFE 119 (A. Pascal ed. 1972). Wage Discrimination cites the
book in which this study was published, Wage Discrimination, supra note 1, at 447 n.191.
but the author apparently overlooked the negative implications of the Pascal-Rapping
study for her thesis.
Of course, one analysis of race discrimination is hardly conclusive even as regards race, let alone sex discrimination. But the Pascal-Rapping study is significant because it is the
only empirical analysis located by either Professor Blumrosen or the present writers that
provides direct evidence as to the existence or lack of linkage, between job segregation
and wage discrimination. When the only direct evidence points to a lack of linkage,
courts cannot be expected to rule that a showing of job segregation warrants a presumption of wage discrimination.
11
Wage Discrimination, supra note 1, at 420-21.
"Id. at 420.
'° The only truly pertinent evidence cited in this subsection is contrary to Wage Discrimination's thesis. The article's handling of this evidence is revealing. Id. at 420 n.100.
The article notes that the NAS REPORT, supra note 10, summarized a social psychological
experiment in which men and women evaluated the job of administrative assistant. Some
of the male and female evaluators were told that the job incumbent was male; others
were told that the incumbent was female.
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Subsection 3, 81 "The Factor of Historical Overt Wage Discrimination," gives examples of disproportionate wages from the period of the Second World War, thirty-five to forty years ago. 82
The history is interesting, but hardly conclusive as to the degree,
or even the existence, of wage discrimination in the 1980's. Yet
Wage Discrimination concludes that "[t]his evidence establishes
that it is more likely than not that where job segregation exists,
the wages of those jobs assigned to minorities and women have
been depressed by virtue of their minority or female status." 83
The inadequacy of such evidence will be apparent if one
imagines the same sort of reasoning applied in a slightly different context. Suppose an age discrimination plaintiff asserts that
he is underpaid. His evidence is that sociologists have found
widespread devaluation of old people in American society. Historically, he demonstrates, derogatory stereotypes of older people
were prevalent for many years, even as recently as the Second
World War. Therefore, he asserts, "this evidence establishes that
it is more likely than not that the wages of older people, myself
specifically, have been depressed on the' basis of age." Discrimination is so much more likely than not, the plaintiff argues, that
the court ought to presume it unless the employer can rebut the
presumption: every older employee ought to have his or her pay
raised by court order unless the employer can prove that each
would have been paid no more if he or she were younger. The
burden of proof would often be impossible, and almost all older
employees would get raises, regardless of the fairness of their
pay.M
The sex of the hypothetical administrative assistant made no difference to the evaluators. Men who were told that the administrative assistant was a man rated the job no
higher than did men who were told that the administrative assistant was a woman. The
only sex difference observed was that men rated the job somewhat higher than did
women - regardless of the sex of the incumbent. Arvey, Passino, & Lounsbury, Job
Analysis Results as Influenced by Sex of Incumbent and Sex of Analyst, 62 J. APP.
PSYCH. 411 (1977).
Wage Discrimination describes these facts but ignores the implications, which run
counter to that article's thesis. Instead, Wage Discrimination surmises that the experimental results may demonstrate self-hatred on the part of women, because "(w)omen
tended to grade more harshly." Wage Discrimination, supra note 1, at 420 n.100. That
inference would have had some support if women had evaluated the administrative assistant job lower ("more harshly") when they were told that the incumbent was a woman.
But since the women evaluators rated the job the same regardless of the sex of the incumbent, Wage Discrimination's speculation about "self-hatred" has no logical basis at
all.
11
Id. at 421-28.
•• For additional details on this period, see Clive, Women Workers in World War II:
Michigan As a Test Case, 20 LAB. HIST. No. 1, at 5 (1979).
13
Wage Discrimination, supra note 1, at 427-28.
" The analogy is less than perfect, however, in one important respect. Many older
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The last section of part I, "Translation of Discriminatory Devaluation Into Lower Pay Rates," 65 begins by describing how
prejudice could operate to reduce wages for women's jobs. Job
evaluation systems require the exercise of judgment. If the persons making judgments are biased, their job evaluation decisions
may reflect their biases. 66 The subsequent subsections theorize
that it would be possible for bias to enter into the determination
of wages by other routes: through reliance on other employers'
pay scales, 67 through the continuation of historically biased wage
rates, ax or through collective bargaining by biased representatives. 69
These are plausible theories, but they do not help the reader
- or the courts - to answer the critical questions: does wage
discrimination exist in the wage structures of particular employers, and if so, which employers, and how much wage discrimination? Theories that suggest, however plau!,ibly, that biases can
enter into the setting of wages have the same limitation as the
following analysis of predatory pricing in the antitrust context:
(1) merchants can attempt to gain a monopoly by predatory
pr1cmg; (2) several methods exist of implementing predatory
pricing; (3) in the past, many merchants have used predatory
pricing; (4) it seems probable that many merchants are using
predatory pricing now; (5) therefore, the courts should presume
that every merchant accused by its competitors of predatory pricing is liable for damages unless it can prove otherwise. The logical defect is that none of the four propositions, nor all of them
combined, logically warrants the conclusion, which is the analog
of Wage Discrimination's proposed presumption that all
"women's" jobs are paid less than their true "worth."
Subsections 6 and 770 review the controversies among theoretical economists as to residual wage differentials. Professor Blumrosen acknowledges that in the classical economic theory of free
people work in jobs identical to those done by younger people, and for equal pay. In those
situations, the employer can prove fairness by demonstrating equal pay for equal work.
In Wage Discrimination's comparable worth theory, the male and female jobs are different by definition (the theory applies only to comparisons of different jobs), so direct comparisons of wage rates would prove nothing.
,. Wage Discrimination, supra note 1, at 428-57.
11
Job evaluation systems require judgments at the levels of job analysis, job description, and selection and weighting of compensable factors. Bias could distort any of these
judgments. Id. at 428-41.
" Id. at 441-43.
'" Id. at 443-44.
" Id. at 444-45.
70
Id. at 445-54.
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markets, discrimination on the basis of sex is impossible. 71 Of
course, sex discrimination does occur, so neoclassical economists
have posited that employers may discriminate at least-insofar as
they are willing to pay for the exercise of their "taste" for discrimination by earning lower profits, 72 or insofar as they are
forced into discrimination by the discriminatory "tastes" of male
employees, or by their perceptions of employees' preferences. 73
The classical and neoclassical economic theorists have been
challenged by competing theories which predict that employers
can, in some circumstances of imperfect competition, profit by
paying women proportionately less than men. 74 The bearing of
these several economic theories on the issue for which they are
cited might be summed up as follows. Economists disagree: some
theories allow coexistence between the profit motive and wage
discrimination; others do not.
The entire argument of Wage Discrimination up to this point
is theoretical and inferential, a series of permutations of one basic theme. That theme is: (1) prejudice against women is widespread; (2) prejudice against women could result in disproportionately low wages for women's jobs; (3) therefore, the wages for
women's jobs probably are lower than would be the case if the
jobs were performed by men. While each premise is plausible,
the syllogism is hardly conclusive and, most importantly, offers
no hint as to how much disproportion in wages exists or which
employers are paying disproportionately. If, as Wage Discrimination contends, Title VII prohibits residual wage differentials, the
prohibition would have to remain a dead letter unless the courts
could determine which employers are underpaying "women's"
jobs, and by how much the jobs are underpaid.
The final section75 of Wage Discrimination's part I is therefore
of great importance to its thesis. In the entire 101-page article,
only these four pages cite data that allegedly bear directly on the
assessment of residual wage differentials in modern business enterprises. 76 It is surprising that this brief section consists of little
" Id. at 446.
72
Id. at 446-47. The leading theoretical work of this persuasion, G. BECKER, THE EcoNOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION (2d ed 1971), has been cogently criticized in J. MADDEN, THE
ECONOMICS OF SEX DISCRIMINATION 37-39, 42-48, 105-06 (1973).
13 Wage Discrimination, supra note 1, at 447-48.
" Id. at 448-54.
,. Id. at 454-57.
71
In other contexts, Wage Discrimination cites extensively to a report that contains
such data, U.S. CoMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, SOCIAL INDICATORS OF EQUALITY FOR MINORITIES
AND WOMEN (1978) (cited by Wage Discrimination, supra note 1, at nn.17, 21, 22, 23, 25,
50, 56, 58, 68, 78, 82, & 232). But Wage Discrimination does not review the multiple
regression analyses cited in this report.
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more than an attempt to explain away the findings of the
econometric studies, for they run contrary to Professor Blumrosen's thesis. 77 Even more surprising is the fact that the studies
to which she refers do not attempt to separate wage discrimination from discriminatory job assignment. 78 The economic studies
Wage Discrimination cites are, therefore, irrelevant to its thesis.
The author is simply incorrect when she asserts: "These studies
confirm that there is a significant relationship between job segre. gation and wage discrimination against the minorities and
women holding the segregated jobs. " 71 The economic studies do
not and could not support any such conclusion, as will be
demonstrated below. 80
77 Professor Blumrosen does not specify the particular economic studies to which she
refers in Wage Discrimination, supra note 1, et 454-55, es running counter to her thesis.
She writes, "(t]hese studies have used," "many of the studies, however," "these analyses," "the analyst," "[t]hese studies tended," and "(t]he studies rarely examined," id. et
454, without citing any of the primary sources she hes in mind.
19
Wage Discrimination refers, through a summary in a secondary source, to primary
sources, some unpublished, by Blinder, Cohen, Fuchs, Melkiel & Melkiel, end Oaxaca.
Id. et 456 n.220, Table 1. These studies do not separate wage discrimination from discriminatory job assignment. See note 85 infra.
1
• Id. et 454 .
.. It may be noted that the tone of Wage Discrimination's section on economic analyses
is apologetic. Although it makes one flat (but incorrect) statement that economic analyses support the existence of wage discrimination, see id. et 454 & nn.33 & 92, the bulk of
conclusory language in this section attempts to explain away embarrassing results:
These studies have used varying methods end different date which make comparisons difficult . . . . Many of the studies, however, defined discrimination to
include only actions motivated by ill will. Discrimination identified by a showing
of adverse effect on minorities end women is excluded from these analyses . . . .
Hence, the conclusions reached may be understated . . . . The studies rarely
examined the interaction of wage discrimination end restrictions on upward mobility together, which hes been the focus of Pert I of this article.
Id. et 454. This assertion is not only en "explaining away" qualification, it is also inaccurate. All of the econometric studies cited by Wage Discrimination consider job segregation end wage discrimination together. Professor Blumrosen's reel complaint is not that
the studies failed to examine job segregation end wage discrimination "together," but
rather that the two were examined together, not separately. But es explained in pert I of
the present article, lumping together of job segregation end wage discrimination (if it
occurs) is inherent in econometric methods. Wage Discrimination continues: "[M]uch of
the difference between the studies is explainable because of different notions of whet are
legitimate productivity characteristics. One~s choice of variables, in feet, can eliminate
discrimination completely." Id. et 455.
The section on economic analyses then concludes with en entire paragraph of
qualification:
[T]he economists' judgment . . . may be useful . . . subject to the cautionary
note . . . suggested above . . . . [N)o mechanical application . . . would be appropriate. At the most, the economists' views might provide a useful starting
point in the shaping of a remedy which will be based on the facts before the
court, not abstract economic consideretio~s.
Id.
Even if the econometric study of multiple regression residuals did tend to support
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Wage Discrimination's citation of the economic literature consists of three secondary sources which review a substantial number of econometric research studies. 81 The studies all attempt to
dissect the gross earnings differentials among sexes and/or races
into components. Some components clearly are legitimate: for
example, women are employed on the average fewer hours than
men, hence they earn less. 82 The legitimacy of some other statistical correlates of wage differentials is open to question. For example, older blacks have, on the average, less education than
older whites, and the racial earnings gap is largest among older
workers. 83 Thus, statistically speaking, education "explains" part
Wage Discriminntion's position, no conclusions could be drawn with the certainty that
courts would require before talcing an enormous leap into judicial restructuring of the
economy. Economists are aware that statistics have their limitations as well as their uses.
For example, in a book cited by Wage Discriminntion, economists Wohlstetter and Coleman conclude:
These examples suggest how hard it is to disentangle the effects of current discrimination in the marketplace from the various results of multiple past discriminations that may in turn have made it unlikely that a minority can compete
currently on equal terms . . . . The proportion of the current income differences
that is attributable to current discrimination in the marketplace is extremely
difficult to determine and, in spite of several attempts, does not seem to us to
have been measured convincingly.
Wohlstetter & Coleman, Race Differences in Income, in RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN EcoNOMIC LIFE 3, 44-45 (A. Pascal ed. 1972), cited in Wage Discriminntion, supra note 1, at
447 n.191.
In sum, part I of Wage Discriminntion attempts to establish wage discrimination as a
fact, but it consists of fifty-four pages of abstract theory and general induction, and only
a little more than one page of references to secondary data sources. Neither the secondary
sources nor the studies on which the secondary sources are based support Wage Discrimination's theory. As Wage Discriminntion obliquely recognizes, the most that can be said
of the economic studies is that they do not disprove the wage discrimination hypothesis.
Thus the answer to the questions, "Does wage discrimination exist, and if so, how much,
and in what companies and jobs?" is: no one knows. The wage discrimination idea is
novel and untested. It is, in fact, untestable by any economic or statistical method now
known. Wage discrimination must remain merely an abstraction until a method is discovered to measure the "true worth" of jobs. No such method has yet appeared on the
horizon.
" The secondary sources cited in Wage Discriminntion, supra note 1, at 454-56 nn.21820, are Kahne & Kohen, Economic Perspectives on the Role of Women in the American
Economy, 13 J. EcoN. LIT. 1249 (1975); Marshall, The Economics of Racial Discriminntion: A Survey, 12 J. EcoN. LIT. 849 (1974); and Oaxaca, Theory and Measurement in the
Economics of Discrimination, in EQUAL RIGHTS AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS (L. Hausman,
0. Ashenfelter, B. Rustin, R. Shubert, & D. Sleiman eds. 1977).
•• Cohen, Sex Differences in Compensation, 6 J. HUMAN RESOURCES 434, 442-43 (1971).
Cohen's econometric analysis reported that, among nonprofessional men and women employed full time, the average workweek for men was more than 10% longer than for women. The greater number of hours worked by men accounted for about 20~;;, of the difference between the sexes in gross earnings. The proportion of the earnings gap accounted
for would be greater,if premium overtime pay were talcen into consideration .
., See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE OLDER POPULATION: 1978 (Special Studies Series P-23, No. 85, 1979), at
16, Table 14 (education and race) & 24-27, Tables 22-24 (income and race); F. DAVIS, TuE
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of racial earnings differences. Whether educational differences
justify earnings differences morally or legally is a question that
the economists recognize as beyond the scope of their statistical
analysis. At least one component of statistical dissection clearly
represents illegal discrimination: unequal pay for equal work,
when experience, seniority, and productivity are also equal. But,
as acknowledged in one of the reviews that Wage Discrimination
cites, this practice is so rare that it is of little or no practical
consequence. 84
The statistical technique of such dissections is multiple regression analysis. The economist gathers a number of data about
each employee, for example, sex, race, age, education, experience, seniority, and geographic region, as well as earnings. Although no two employees are identical, multiple regression· allows the statistician to estimate what earnings would have been
if the employees were identical in every respect measured except
the variables of interest, e.g., sex and race. 85
Statistical dissection cannot separate the effects of job separation from wage discrimination. Consider, for example, the electrical contractor, mentioned above, which pays its crafts workers, primarily male electricians, more than its clerical workers,
BLACK COMMUNITY'S SOCIAL SECURITY 71 (1978) ("The ratio of Black to White median
income is highest in the 14 to 24 age group and consistently declines for each age level
down to, and including, the 55 to 64 age group.").
•• Kahne & Kohen, supra note 81, at 1261, cited in Wage Discrimination, supra note 1,
at 454 n.218.
85
It must be emphasized that multiple regression yields estimates, which are subject
to error. Among the several sources of error is the fact that the statistical model makes
assumptions that are unlikely to be correct. For example, multiple regression assumes
linear correlations: if education is quantified as number of years of schooling, the technique assumes that the difference between a second grade and a fifth grade education is
worth exactly as much as the difference between a ninth grade and a twelfth grade education. The technique also assumes homoscedasticity (homogeneous distribution of variance) and a number of other statistical symmetries that are unlikely to exist in realworld data. Perhaps most important, multiple regression cannot distinguish the effects of
discrimination from the effects of legitimate factors that it was not possible to measure.
For example, the personnel files of many employers record college degrees but not fields
of study. An econometric study based on such files is forced to count an assistant controller with an M.B.A. in accounting and finance as "equal" in education to a junior accountant with an M.S.W. (master's degree in social welfare). Only one of the eleven results reported in Wage Discrimination, supra note· 1, at 456 n.220, Table 1, controlled for
field of study, and that one study, Malkiel & Malkiel, omitted such pertinent control
variables as age and race. The differences identified as "unexplained differential" in
Wage Discrimination's Table 1 are not estimates of discrimination, as is incorrectly asserted in note b to Table 1. The "unexplained differential" consists of estimates of the
, effects of discrimination plus all unmeasured legitimate sources of wage differences. In
drawing attention to these limitations, we do not mean to disparage multiple regression
or its economist practitioners, but to draw attention to limitations inherent in the technique, limitations which Wage Discrimination passes over rather casually, id. at 455.
These limitations are further discussed in part I B 1 c infra.
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primarily female clerks and bookkeepers. A multiple regression
analysis might dispose of part of the gross earnings difference by
legitimate factors, 88 but in all probability, there would remain a
substantial "residual" difference. The residual difference consists of three components that can be identified theoretically,
but which cannot be separated in the realm of real-life data. One
component of the "residual" is the sum of all unmeasured legitimate reasons for wage differences. 87 A second component is the
effect of discriminatory job assignment. That is, if (1) the electrician's job is "worth" more than the job of clerk, (2) both jobs are
paid what they are worth, and (3) absent discrimination, some of
the female clerks would have been electricians, then (4) the fem ale clerks who would have been electricians have lost wages
because of discriminatory job assignment. 88 The last component
of the statistical residual is that portion, if any, due to wage discrimination. For example, the work of the clerk may be equal in
"worth" to the work .of the electrician, but may be paid only
two-thirds as much, or the clerk's job may be "worth" two-thirds
as much as the electrician's but may be paid only one-half as
much. This is the "pure wage discrimination" referred to in
Wage Discrimination. 89
81
For example, the electricians may work a longer workweek, more overtime, and in
less pleasant surroundings than the clerks .
., See FIGURE 1 in text following note 22 supra.
" Statistical analyses tend to overestimate the magnitude of employer job segregation
because no means is available to separate the effects of job segregation by employers
from job segregation by choice of individual employees. Professor Blumrosen acknowledges, as do almost all commentators, that in American society women have been conditioned to enter traditional "women's" vocations by the entire social milieu. Wage Discrimination, supra note 1, at 416-21. See also J. GALBRAITH, ECONOMICS AND THE PUBLIC
PURPOSE 37 (1973); Cohen, Sex Differences in Compensation, 6 J. HUMAN RESOURCES 434,
437-38 (1971); Fuchs, Differences in Hourly Earnings Between Men and Women,
MONTHLY LAB. REv., May 1971, at 9; Lloyd, The Division of Labor Between the Sexes: A
Review, in SEX, DISCRJMINATION, AND THE DIVISION OF LABOR, supra note 15, at 1, 15;
Sawhill, The Economics of Discrimination Against Women: Some New Findings, 8 J.
HUMAN RESOURCES 383, 391 (1973); Stephenson, Relative Wages and Sex Segregation by
Occupation, in SEX, DISCRIMINATION, AND THE DIVISION OF LABOR, supra note 15, at 175,
197-98; Gwartney & Stroup, Measurement of Employment Discrimination According to
Sex, 39 SOUTHERN EcoN. J. 575 (1973). If the hypothetical electrical contractor's electricians are almost all male, that job segregation may be partly the result of the employer's
discriminatory rejection of qualified female electricians and partly the result of a lack of
female applicants for electrician jobs. The employer is legally accountable only for the
former, but statistical studies, unable to distinguish between employer preferences and
applicant choices, frequently lump the two together and attribute the entirety of job segregation to employer discrimination. In practice, applicant choice is a powerful factor.
See, e.g., H. NORTHRUP & J. LARSON, supra note 15, at 60-64 (extensive recruiting necessary to attract modest number of female "outside" electrical craft trainees; program suffers heavy female attrition).
•• Wage Discrimination, supra note 1, at 455-56 n.22O.
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Economists who have studied discrimination generally have
not attempted to measure the "worth" of jobs independently of
wage rates. 90 No yardstick exists by which such measurements
could be made. 91 Without an independent measure of job worth,
it is impossible to distinguish statistically between the results of
job separation and the results of "pure" wage discrimination.
Moreover, as noted above, none of the forms of discrimination
can be dissected statistically from legitimate but unassessed reasons for different pay. Consequently, Wage Discrimination's
reading of the economic literature is seriously misleading. The
literature shows no "significant relationship between job segregation and wage discrimination. " 92 The literature does not even
demonstrate that "pure" wage discrimination exists, nor do
Wage Discrimination's economic authorities purport to do so. 93
The most that multiple regression analyses can tell us is that
some of the gross earnings differences between the sexes are accounted for legitimately, while the remainder must result from
unmeasured legitimate sources, and/or from job separation, and/
or from wage discrimination.

B.

Problems With Wage Discrimination's Factual Thesis

In its Part I, Wage Discrimination attempts to establish "the
factual aspects of the thesis that wage rates of jobs into which
women and minorities have been historically segregated are
likely to be depressed because those jobs are occupied by 'disfavored groups.' " 9' This factual proposition is demonstrated, according to Wage Discrimination, by "historical, anthropological,
sociological, and economic studies." 95 In summarizing Wage Discrimination's evidence, the present article has drawn attention
to some of the most apparent inadequacies of reasoning and of
evidence. However, the defects of Wage Discrimination's analysis run deeper than the flawed logic and thin evidence that
would warrant a "not proven" verdict. More fundamentally, the
00 See, e.g., SEX, DISCRIMINATION, AND THE DIVISION OF LABOR, supra note 15; WOMEN IN
THE LABOR MARKET (C. Lloyd, E. Andrews, & C. Gilroy eds. 1979).
11
See part I B 1 c infra.
12
Wage Discrimination, supra note 1, at 454.
" The economic studies cited by Wage Discrimination (see note 78 supra) calculate
"unexplained differential" in wages between men and women or between whites and
blacks. Wage Discrimination, supra note 1, at 456 n.220, Table 1. The "unexplained differential" includes unmeasured legitimate causes of wage differentials and the effects of
all sources of discrimination, i.e., all the components of [cl in Figure 1 supra. See note 85
supra and part I B 1 c infra.
" Wage Discrimination, supra note 1, at 401.
" Id. at 401-02.
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evidence runs strongly counter to Wage Discrimination's thesis
on all three dimensions of its attempted proof: theory, authority
and fact.
1. The logic of economic theory - The immediately preceding section of this article has demonstrated that the economic
studies which, Wage Discrimination suppose~, reveal wage discrimination actually show no such phenomenon. Instead, the
economists have demonstrated residual wage differentials, a
term that includes unmeasured nondiscriminatory factors, the
effects of job separation, and the results, if any, of wage discrimination. The problem for a wage discrimination theory, however,
is not just that available data are unsatisfactory, but also that
the entire idea of wage discrimination is grounded on an economic theory, the logic of which precludes an assessment of wage
discrimination.
Wage discrimination is a concept that has meaning only with
respect to the worth of jobs. If a female nurse's work is worth
seven~eighths as much as that of a male real estate appraiser,
but is paid only five-eighths as much, it may be argued that
wage discrimination is occurring. 98 The basic idea of wage discrimination is that wages are disproportionate to the worth of
work performed. Absent some way of establishing the "worth" of
jobs, wage discrimination loses all meaning. It must further be
shown how the worth of work should be measured.
One could attempt to evaluate the worth of jobs in three important ways. These may be called (a) market value, (b) job
evaluation systems, and (c) marginal productivity analysis.
a. Market value. The market value of a job is the common
sense meaning: the conjunction of what an employer is willing to
pay and what a worker is willing to accept. "Worth" in this
sense may be determined individually, as when an executive negotiates an employment contract, or collectively, as in bargaining between unions and employers. Market value serves well
enough for most purposes, and it has the great virtue of determinateness. A job's market value is what is paid. For purposes of
detecting wage discrimination, however, market value is of no
use. As Wage Discrimination points out, 97 market value includes
whatever distortions discrimination may cause. 98
" See, e.g., Lemons v. City & County of Denver, 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 906 (D.
Colo. 1978), aff'd, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), No. 81, at D-1 (10th Cir. April 24, 1980).
" Wage Discrimination, supra note 1, at 441-43.
11
It would be possible to assess the "worth" of jobs by a criterion closely related to,
but distinct from, market value: the opinions of employees as to a fair wage for each job.
The opinion standard would, of course, be of no use for proving wage discrimination, as it
would be subject to the same kinds of biases as the market value standard.
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b. Job evaluation systems. Job evaluation systems attempt
to assess such factors as skill, effort, responsibility, and working
conditions, so as to rank the relative worth of jobs. 99 But for a
number of reasons which are ably set forth in Wage Discrimination, 100 job evaluation systems are inherently too subjective to be
useful as anchors for the concept of wage discrimination. Job
evaluation systems are basically methods for systematizing and
recording subjective judgments, and at each stage in the process
- job analysis, job description, selection of compensable factors,
weighting of compensable factors, and the selection of the
breadth of jobs to which a particular system will be applied the necessarily subjective judgments inevitably incorporate individual and societal biases. rn• Wage Discrimination is correct in
However, opinions concerning the fairness of men's and women's wages do have important implications for the practicality of the remedies that Wage Discrimination would
prescribe. An employer, court, or legislature that attempts to impose a pay schedule that
violates employees' beliefs about fairness of wages will produce low morale, high turnover, and loss of productivity. Thurow, Equity Concepts and the World of Work, in MEASURING WORK QUALITY FOR SocIAL REPORTING 207, 207-13 (A. Biderman & T. Drury eds.
1976).
.
Men's and women's beliefs about the fairness of their pay have been studied. R. CuRTIN, INCOME EQUITY AMONG U.S. WORKERS (1977). Curtin's data show widespread satisfaction with the fairness of one's own pay as compared with the pay of others, and the
proportion of satisfied workers increased between an initial survey in 1973 and a later
survey in 1975. Id. at 36. When respondents were asked to compare their pay rate with
that of others in their own occupation, women were more often satisfied with the fairness
of their pay than were men. When the comparisons were across occupations, e.g., comparing a secretary with an electrician, the proportions of women and men who felt that
they were paid the "amount deserved or more" were very nearly equal:
The implication of this data is that if Wage Discrimination's proposals were adopted,
and most women's wages substantially increased, a large proportion of women would be
paid much more, and a large proportion of men much less, than they believe their jobs
are worth. If the existence of wage discrimination is not even perceived by most workers,
male and female alike, it would be a bold employer, court, or Congress that imposed such
a remedy.
" NAS REPORT, supra note 10, at 1-7. See also Wage Discrimination, supra note 1, at
428-34.
'"" Wage Discrimination, supra note 1, at 434-41.
1• 1 Id. at 435-41. The quest for a purely technocratic method of wage determination-a
job evaluation system independent of subjective judgments and biases-is futile. Job
evaluation systems mute individual biases, but a committee's consensus is not objective
just because several people participated. As prospective yardsticks for assessment of job
"worth," job evaluation systems· also suffer from the problem that no one system is
adaptable to all jobs. Even for jobs as similar as those in the steel and aluminum industries, the job evaluation system developed for one industry was unsuited to the other.
NAS REPORT, supra note 10, at 6. If jobs in the steel and aluminum industries require
different job evaluation systems, it would seem unlikely that a single system can serve as
the measure of "worth" for the entire spectrum of jobs, from abrasive tool operator to
zymurgist. An additional difficulty that would confront an effort to set wages according
to a universal job evaluation system is the fact that job evaluation systems have purposes
and uses other than the setting of wages. See, e.g., Suskin, Job Evaluation-It's More
Than a Tool For Setting Pay Rates, 31 PUB. PERSONNEL REv. 283 (Oct. 1970). A multi-
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noting that job evaluation systems are inherently too subjective
to be satisfactory observation points from which bias could be
detected.
The EEOC has commissioned a study of job evaluation systems by the NAS in the hope that a new system, unbiased and
universally applicable, can be developed.' 02 Such a job evaluation system (JES) presumably would be the fulcrum from which
all types of pay "inequities" could be levered into line. If the
NAS's interim report103 presages its final conclusions, the EEOC
will be disappointed. According to the NAS Report, job evaluation systems are problematic and have troublesome features. 10~
The best-known JES, the proprietary Hay Associates system, is
extremely subjective and fails to distinguish well at lower job
levels. 105 Different JES's can produce quite different evaluations
of the "worth" of the same job. 106 Even in two basic metal industries, steel and aluminum, which cover a very small segment of
the spectrum of all jobs, it has proved impossible to develop a
single JES suitable to both. 107 And even if a universally acceptable and fair JES were possible, the unreliability of ratings probably would preclude its use. 108 All in all, the NAS Report concludes, "the evidence is not particularly encouraging." 109
purpose system will necessarily be a compromise and not precisely fitted to any single
purpose.
102 See text accompanying note 10 supra. The Women's Bureau of the Department of
Labor also plans to fund research with this objective. Remarks of Alexis Herman, Director, Women's Bureau, to Organizing Conference of Coalition of Labor Union Women,
Washington, D.C. (Jan. 24, 1980), in DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), No. 17, at E-1 (Jan. 24,
1980).
103 NAS REPORT, supra note 10.
104 Id. at xii, 30.
105
/d. at 22-23.
108
/d. at 35, 39.
107 Id. at 6.
1.. Id. at 41. Reported reliabilities of job evaluation systems range from about .34 to
about .95 on the correlation coefficient scale of O to 1. Id. Even when reliability is as high
as .90, serious misclassification will occur with considerable frequency. For example, if
jobs were graded on a scale from 1 to 16, and reliability were .90, one of twenty jobs
whose true grade was 8 would be misgraded into grades 1-4 or grades 12-16. While a
reliability of .90 is satisfactory for purposes of aggregate statistical analysis, a serious
misgrading of 5% of jobs obviously would be unacceptable. The NAS REPORT properly
concludes: "[J)ob evaluation procedures may not be very reliable given the purpose they
are meant to serve." Id.
1°' Id. at 40. See also Paterson & Husband, Decision Making Responsibility: Yardstick
for Job Evaluation, 2 COMPENSATION REv., No. 2, at 21 (1970). This article, cited by Wage
Discrimination for another purpose, is highly critical of existing job evaluation systems.
On the failure of job evaluation systems as applied to high-level jobs, see G. WASHINGTON
& V. ROTHSCHILD, 1 COMPENSATING THE CORPORATE EXECUTIVE 23 n.75 (3d ed. 1962);
Mautz & Rock, The Wages of Management, 11 U. FLA. L. REv. 474, 508 (1958). See also
Patton, What Is an Executive Worth?, 39 HARv. Bus. REv. 65, 72 (March-April 1961).
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c. Marginal productivity analysis. Marginal productivity
analysis measures the worth of work by the value that the work
adds to the total output of the enterprise. 11° For example, suppose that widgets are manufactured by first stamping them from
sheets of widget-stock, then polishing them. A widget stamper
and a widget polisher each can process 100 widgets per day. If
widget stock costs 10¢ per widget, and if stamped but unpolished
widgets are worth 50¢ each, and if polished widgets a·re worth
$3.00 each, the work of the polisher is worth $250 per day, while
the work of the stamper is worth only $40 per day.'1 1 This is what
economists usually mean when they speak of the theoretical or
"true worth" of jobs. 112
In spite of the intellectual elegance of marginal productivity
theory, real-world wages are rarely, if ever, set by reference to
marginal productivity analysis. 113 One reason is that few enterprises are as conveniently compartmentalized as the theoretician's widget factory. The typist, the security guard, the supervisor, the maintenance mechanic, and the receptionist all perform
vital functions in modern industry, but economists recognize
that it would be futile to try to identify the increment in profit
N. TOLLES, ORIGINS OF MODERN WAGE THEORIES 19-20 (1964).
The example is oversimplified for purposes of illustration, as it does not take capital
costs into account. If the stamping machine had a fair rental value of $10 per day, and
the polishing machine rented for $220 per day, the productivity of the labor involved in
the two jobs would be equal.
112
Where the schools of economic theory differ is in the size, distribution, and explanation of differences between the "true worth" of jobs as measured by marginal productivity and the "worth" of those same jobs in the marketplace. See, e.g., N. TOLLES, supra
note 110, at 8-24. For a more technical explanation of marginal productivity as the theoretical measure of job worth, see P. SAMUELSON, EcoNOMICS 541-45 (10th ed. 1976).
113
See, e.g., A. WooD, A THEORY OF PAY (1978); Belcher, Employee and Executive
Compensation, in EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS •REsEARCH 73, .77-80 (H. Heneman, Jr., L.
Brown, M. Chandler, R. Kahn, H. Parnes & G. Shultz eds. 1960) (survey of literature
shows that important determinants of wages are labor market prices, union pressure,
labor supply, product market competition, expected profits, employee satisfaction, and
company prestige; marginal productivity is not mentioned); Foster & Kanin-Lovers, Determinants of Organizational Pay Policy, 9 COMPENSATION REv., No. 3, at 35 (1977) (marginal productivity not mentioned); Woodhead, Are You Using the Right Pay Policy?, 40
CANADIAN Bus., No. 12, at 40 (1975) (pay determined by several factors, not including
marginal productivity). The fact that wages are set according to factors other than marginal productivity analysis does not imply that productivity and wages are unrelated. In
the long run, but not in the short run, productivity and wages are closely related.
Belcher, supra, at 76.
One reason that marginal productivity analysis is not used in setting wages is that the
necessary data do not exist. L. THUROW, PovERTY AND D1sCRIMINATION 44 (1969). Probably
the closest approach to pay on the basis of marginal productivity is in the compensation
of salesworkers on a commission basis. Commissions are only a rough approximation of
marginal productivity for a number of reasons, one of which is the competitive market in
sales commissions. Employers must pay the "going rate" of commissions even if it exceeds the current profit per sale.
IIO
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that each such job adds to the total enterprise.
Neverthele~s, if wage discrimination were to have a practical
meaning, the discrimination would be measured by reference to
marginal productivity. This would apply both in economic theory and in a common sense meaning of "wage discrimination."
To say that a person is not paid "what the job is worth" often
means that there is a larger difference than is normal between
the value of the job to the enterprise, in the marginal productivity sense, and the wages paid for the job. Hence the job is paid
less in proportion to its marginal productivity than. are other
jobs.
Because the marginal productivity of jobs can almost never be
measured directly, economists have used the indirect approach
of multiple regression analysis. 114 If one assumes that everyone is
employed in a job commensurate with his or her abilities, and if,
on average, abilities are highly correlated with such measurable
job qualifications as education and experience, then productivity
would increase with job qualifications. If equally "qualified"
groups of men and women, e.g., college graduates, are paid differently, discrimination may be the explanation. It is this kind of
indirect and inferential analysis that is employed in the
·econometric studies diagrammed in Figure 1 of this article, 115
and whose results are summarized in Wage Discrimination's Table 1. 116
The logic of multiple regression analysis, however, precludes
direct evidence of wage discrimination. Econometric studies of
residual wage differentials measure differences after statistical
adjustments to equate groups for education, experience, and
other surrogates for the unmeasurable variable, productivity.
But the residual wage differentials thus identified cannot be separated into effects of differential job choice, job segregation, and
wage discrimination ([d], [f] and [g] respectively in Figure 1).
The reason will be apparent if one considers again the hypothetical example of the electrical contractor. Suppose the contractor's
receptionist, a female, earns one-half the salary of the male electrical crafts workers, and suppose she is equal to the average
electrician in experience, education, and seniority. With no inde"' See, e.g., R. TSUCHIGANE & N. DODGE, EcoNOMIC DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN IN
THE UNITED STATES 29-50 (1975) [hereinafter cited as ECONOMIC D1scR1MINATION); Stevenson, Relative Wages and Sex Segregation by Occupation, in SEX, DISCRIMINATION, AND THE
DIVISION OF LABOR, supra note 15, at 175; M. Hamilton, A Study of Wage Discrimination
by Sex: A Sample Survey in the Chicago Area (unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Univ. of
Pa. 1969).
11 • See text accompanying note 22 supra.
"' Wage Discrimination, supra note 1, at 456 n.220.
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pendent measure of the marginal productivity of jobs, one has no
evidence to inform a choice among the following possibilities:
(a) The residual wage differential is entirely due to job
segregation. That is, the receptionist is fairly paid in relation to the work that she does, but she has been discriminatorily assigned to a job that is "worth" less, in the marginal productivity sense, than the jobs reserved for the
male electricians.
(b) The same as (a), but the receptionist's job assignment is hers by her choice; the discrimination was in her
upbringing, not by her employer.
(c) The residual wage differential is entirely due to wage
discrimination. That is, the marginal productivity of the
receptionist's job, if it could be measured, would be equal
to that of the electrician's; it is because the receptionist's
job is "women's work" that it is underpaid.
(d) Any combination of (a), (b), and (c).
Except in rare instances, 117 all econometric studies of wage discrimination must use the same basic logic and thus must produce equally inconclusive results. One is forced to the conclusion
that for purposes of evaluating alleged wage discrimination, none
of the three theoretical methods.of assessing job "worth" is viable. Market value is relatively precise, but if wage discrimination
exists, it may be incorporated in market rates. Job evaluation
systems are highly imprecise and, like market rates, may or may
not be biased. Marginal productivity cannot be measured at all
for most jobs, and even if it could, multiple regression analysis
cannot dissect wage discrimination from other sources of residual
wage differentials.
Suggestive but fragmentary evidence on the relative importance of job separation and/or individual choice, on the one
hand, and wage discrimination, on the other hand, exists in the
contrasts among econometric studies that have analyzed wide
versus narrow ranges of jobs. At one extreme are studies that
encompass a very wide range of jobs, jobs that obviously vary in
"worth" by any definition. Such studies invariably find substantial residual wage differentials, and it is a fair inference that
much of the residual wage differential are the consequence of
job segregation ([f] in Figure 1) and/or individual choice ([d] in
117
The rare exceptions are those in which the men and women perform identical work,
and in which, therefore, their marginal productivity is known to be the same or nearly
the same. As to these situations, see text at notes 119-22 infra.
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Figure 1). 118 At the other extreme are studies in which only one
job {[g'] in Figure 1) or a narrow set of jobs is analyzed, e.g., the
study of racial differences in pay of baseball players. 119 It is to
such studies that Wage Discrimination refers when it speaks of
"controlling for occupational affiliation." 120 When the range of
jobs is narrowed, Wage Discrimination acknowledges, the result
is a diminution in "the estimated effects of discrimination." 121
Thus, Wage Discrimination admits, "[o]ne's choice of variables,
in fact, can eliminate discrimination completely." 122 The elimination of statistical suggestions of .discrimination occurs when
one focuses on the one situation in which effects of job segregation and individual vocational choice are eliminated, and in
which, therefore, any discriminatory residual wage differentials
must be due to wage discrimination. That situation is the comparison of men and women doing identical jobs { [g'] in Figure 1).
Wage Discrimination admits that relatively little discrimination
occurs in the context of women and men performing equal
work. 123
The virtual disappearance of residual wage differentials when
the effects of job separation are eliminated at first seems strong
evidence against the existence of substantial wage discrimination. It is possible, however, that employee resistance to the unfairness of unequal pay for identical work discourages wage discrimination when jobs are very similar but not when jobs are
dissimilar. Nevertheless, what evidence there is against the existence of substantial wage discrimination is important when contrasted with the complete absence of econometric evidence for
the existence of substantial wage discrimination. 124
See, e.g., ECONOMIC DISCRIMINATION, supra note 114.
See note 57 supra. See also Fuchs, supra note 88, at 9.
''" Wage Discrimination, supra note 1, at 455 n.220.
IZI Id.
122
Id. at 455; accord, J. MADDEN, supra note 72, at 92.
Wage Discrimination, supra note 1, at 454 n.218, quoting Kahne & Kohen, supra
note 81, at 1261.
,.. In conjunction with the upsurge of feminist activity during the 1970's, economists,
and especially feminist economists, greatly elaborated and expanded econometric studies
of sex discrimination. The most recent, and by far the most technically developed, collection of such studies appeared too late for citation in Wage Discrimination. WOMEN IN THE
LABOR MARKET, supra note 90. This collection represents the most scientifically advanced
analysis ever published on the economics of sex discrimination, yet it in no way disturbs
the conclusions of the present article. The conclusions of one of the chapter authors,
Chiplin, are typical: "This article has questioned whether the residual [wage differential)
approach . . . can provide any guidance to the existence or extent of sex discrimination
. . . . [M]any of us might believe that sex discrimination exists, but do we know?"
Chiplin, An Evaluation of Sex Discrimination: Some Problems and a Suggested Reorientation, in id. at 266-67.
118

111
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2. Lack of authority for Wage Discrimination's thesis Before the courts or the Congress would act on the premise that
jobs done largely by women and blacks are paid less than they
are "worth," they would likely require near unanimity among
the experts that the problem at least exists.
It is not possible to mobilize such a showing of authoritative
opinion. Part I of Professor Blumrosen's article is a compilation
of authorities regarding a great many forms of economic and social discrimination against women and blacks, but not wage discrimination. If one were to read part I hastily, one could come
away with the impression that wage discrimination is an accepted concept and a proven fact, for the article cites many
economists on many facets of labor economics. A close reading,
however, reveals that none of Professor Blumrosen's authorities
is claimed to have proven or even to have discussed wage discrimination in the sense that she uses the term. The closest that
her authorities come to her concept is in the studies of residual
wage differentials, and that is an idea of very much broader
scope than wage discrimination. 125
125
See text accompanying notes 86-92 supra. The principal economic studies cited in
Wage Discrimination are those by the distinguished liberal economist, John Galbraith, J.
GALBRAITH, ECONOMICS AND THE PUBLIC PURPOSE (1973); the present Secretary of Labor,
Ray Marshall, supra note 81; a recent Secretary of Commerce, J. KREPS, SEX IN THE
MARKETPLACE: AMERICAN WOMEN AT WoRK (1971); and the academicians Lloyd, Sawhill,
Oaxaca, Madden, and Kahne & Kohen. Kahne & Kohen, Economic Perspectives on the
Role of Women in the American Economy, 13 J. EcoN. LIT. 1249 (1975); Lloyd, The
Division of Labor Between the Sexes: A Review, in SEX, D1SCRIMINATION, AND THE DIVISION
OF LABOR, supra note 15, at l; J. MADDEN, supra note 72; Oaxaca, supra note 81; Sawhill,
supra note 8. Kreps, Floyd, Sawhill, Madden and Kahne are female. The scope of Professor Blumrosen's authorities is very broad, for four of the works she cites are surveys of the
entire literature on discrimination against women in the workplace. See the works of
Marshall, Kreps, Oaxaca, and Kahne & Kohen supra.
Surprising as it may seem, nowhere in these works does one find even the idea of wage
discrimination, much less assertions that it exists to a significant degree, or that it exists
at all. In a search for scholarly opinion and data on wage discrimination, the present
authors have reviewed a number of authorities not cited by Professor Blumrosen. Such
opinion and data were notable by their paucity.
We have located only two works by economists which recognize the possibility of wage
discrimination. EcoNOMIC DISCRIMINATION, supra note 114; L. TuuROW, supra note 113.
Writing in the context of race discrimination, Thurow dissects the theoretically conceivable types of invidious economic discrimination into seven categories, one of which is wage
discrimination. Although Thurow recognizes wage discrimination as a theoretical possibility, he is hesitant to draw conclusions from his econometric analysis. L. THUROW,
supra note 113, at 7, 44. As remedies for the seven types of discrimination, in whatever
proportions they may occur, Thurow proposes a large number of government interventions, but not the direct assault on presumed wage discrimination that Professor Blumrosen proposes. He makes a strong case, instead, for changes in government control of the
economy as a whole, or what are commonly referred to as aggregate economic policies:
As a practical policy instrument, creating tighter markets presents several advantages. Aggregate economic policies are impersonal. They can be implemented
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It is difficult to find discussions of wage discrimination even if
one moves outside the realm of economics. For example, one
might expect to find the concept discussed in hearings before the
EEOC, but in the hearings cited by Wage Discrimination, nearly
one thousand pages were devoted to job separation, yet wage discrimination was never mentioned. 128
3. Alternatives to the thesis - No one disputes that residual
wage differentials occur. The question is what causes these differences: wage discrimination, other factors, or both? Professor
Blumrosen assumes that the role of wage discrimination must be
large, but this assumption is unwarranted. The importance of alternative explanations has been amply demonstrated.
a. The factor of job separation. None of the parties to the
comparable worth controversy argues that all jobs are of equal
value. None would dispute that managerial jobs are "worth"
more than production jobs, that craft jobs are "worth" more
than semiskilled jobs, or that jobs that require extensive specialized training and education are "worth" more than those that do
not. Professor Blumrosen has cited many studies that show beyond any doubt that managerial jobs, crafts jobs, and jobs that
require extensive specialized training and education are jobs performed mainly by men. 127
To the extent that this job separation is caused by employer
discrimination against women, remedies already exist in Title
VII: it is illegal to refuse to hire or promote into high-value jobs
because of sex. 128 The comparable worth theory and Professor
without recruiting a bureaucracy of administrators, trainers, teachers and social
workers. They do not require state and local cooperation. They do not interfere
with personal choice. They can be quickly implemented; they are cheaply implemented; and they can become effective in a short period time.
Id. at 64-65. The entire field of the economics of discrimination is in a state of flux and
scholarly disagreement. See, e.g., Aigner & Cain, Statistical Theories of Discrimination
in Labor Markets, 30 INDUS. & LAB. REL. R.Ev. 175 (1977).
111
Hearing Before the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission on Discrimination in White Collar Employment, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968). (This volume is cited in
Wage Discrimination, supra note 1, at 407 n.40, as the source of a quotation by former
EEOC Commissioner Hernandez, but the citation appears to be erroneous, as Hernandez
did not testify at the hearing, nor did she submit remarks for the record.).
127 Wage Discrimination, supra note 1, at nn.3, 9, 10, 11, 17, 21, 26, 28, 29-39, 57, 61,
62, 65, 84-88, 194, 196, 198, & 215.
1211 Of course, not all job separation is the result of discrimination by employers. Parents, schools, and our society in general discriminate very strongly, producing among
women and men quite different ideas as to the vocations they can and should select. This
phenomenon is called sex role differentiation or sex typing. Fuchs, Women's Earnings:
Recent Trends and Long-Run Prospects, MONTHLY LAB. REv., May 1979, at 23; J. GALBRAITH, supra note 125, at 37; J. KREPS, supra note 125, at 42-46; E. MACCOBY & ·c. JACK·
LIN, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SEX DIFFERENCES 277-348 (1974); Sawhill, supra note 125, at 39194; Stephenson, Relative Wages and Sex Segregation by Occupation, in SEx, D1scR1MtNA-
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Blumrosen's proposed remedies would do nothing to end job separation. In fact, her proposed pay raises for "women's" jobs
would tend to perpetuate job separation by eliminating major incentives for women to seek non-traditional jobs. 129
b. The factor of ''iob crowding." Job separation is most likely
the consequence both of sex role differentiation 130 and job segregation. Regardless of the cause, the result is "crowding" of
women into a restricted spectrum of jobs and a concomitant decrease in the market value of their services. 131 Technically, the
crowding theory proposes that wage differentials occur because
members of a group are excluded (or exclude themselves) from
some occupations, hence are "crowded" into others. To the extent that wages are elastic with respect to the number of applicants, wages are depressed in the crowded occupations. 132 This
situation can be alleviated by opening .up all jobs to both sexes,
i.e., by enforcement of Title VII as Congress intended. 133 Courtmandated pay raises would exacerbate crowding, not alleviate it.

C.

Failure to Demonstrate Wage Discrimination

Part A of this section showed that the facts and the analysis of
Professor Blumrosen's article were insufficient to make a case
that wage discrimination is an important phenomenon. Part B
TION, AND THE DIVISION OF LABOR, supra note 15, at 175, 197. But see R. KANTER, MEN AND
WOMEN OF THE CORPORATION 260-64 (1977) (sex role differentiation far from complete explanation of job separation).
'" Pay raises for "women's" jobs would make those jobs more attractive to men as well
as women, and some integration of "women's" jobs might result. However, the entry of
men into "women's" jobs would produce no reciprocal incentive for women to seek
"men's" jobs.
130
See note 128 supra.
131 The economist and former Secretary of Commerce Juanita Kreps expressed the consensus of scholars when she wrote:
·
[T)he concentration of women in the accepted female occupations of elementary
teaching, nursing, clerical and service-type jobs would seem . . . to indicate
some reluctance on the part of women to venture into men's occupational territory, or some reluctance on the part of employers to offer men and women wider
job options, probably both.
J. KREPS, supra note 125, at 36. Professor Kreps further states:
H women would make economic gains, they need to realize that market forces do
have an impact, and that they cannot continue to offer an excess supply of a
particular talent such as elementary school teaching, and yet expect the salary
for that job to keep pace with that in professions which are understaffed .
. Id. at 106-07.
132
Bergmann, The Effect on White Incomes of Discrimination in Employment, 79 J.
PoL. EcoN. 294 (1971); Johnson & Stafford, Women and the Academic Labor Market, in
SEX, DISCRIMINATION, AND THE DIVISION OF LABOR, supra note 15, at 201, 212; Stephenson,
supra note 128, at 175.
,.. See part II infra.
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showed that the factual thesis of Wage Discrimination is mistaken in its logic and unsupported by expert authority. Moreover, well-established alternative explanations account for much,
if not all, of the wage differentials that Professor Blumrosen attributes to wage discrimination. Before the law can attempt to
act on wage discrimination, the phenomenon must be defined,
demonstrated, and measured with a great deal more precision
than now seems possible.
II.

TITLE

VII

AND RESIDUAL

w AGE

DIFFERENTIALS

A number of substantial legal problems bar the adoption of
the job separation-cum-wage discrimination theory outlined by
Professor Blumrosen. The first of these legal difficulties is the
fact that the legislative history of the pertinent statutes is inconsistent with the interpretation that her article would place on
them. If the EEOC and the courts adopt the Blumrosen theory,
a major restructuring of the American economy will likely result.134 It is implausible that Congress intended such an upheaval
in wage structures when it enacted Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 and the amendments to Title VII in 1972 without
134
It is hard to overstate the potential dollar impact of the Blumrosen theory upon the
American economy. Statistics cited by Professor Blumrosen indicate that the average
earnings of full-time women workers are less than sixty percent of the average for fulltime working men. Wage Discrimination, supra note 1, at 410. It is her contention that
"[f)rom 20% to 50% of the wage differential between men and women has been attributed
to factors which cannot be justified on grounds unrelated to discrimination." Id. at 497.
Finally, she states that "most women work in 'women's jobs' " and that a substantial
number of women work in jobs that are more than seventy percent female-intensive. Id.
at 405-06. Given this battery of statistics, it is clear that a broad scale application of
Professor Blumrosen's theory would require a vast sum of money to achieve true pay
parity across the spectrum of jobs in the American work force covered by Title VII. It was
estimated in 1978 that "to raise the aggregate pay of the country's 27.3 million full-time
working women high enough so that the median pay for women would equal that of men
would add a staggering $150 billion a year to civilian payrolls." Smith, The EEOC's Bold
Foray Into Job Evaluation, FORTUNE, Sept. 11, 1978, at 58-59. Congress could not have
intended this cataclysmic impact on the American e_conomy, since it made no reference
to such a result in the legislative history underlying Title VII. The gravest consequences
would inexorably flow from such a drastic imposition of liability upon employers: competition between companies would become dependent largely on pay parity factors extraneous to normal market concerns; American companies would have less ability to compete
in the international market, with a corresponding increase in the balance of payments
deficit; collective bargaining relations between employers and unions would become unsettled if artificial pay levels were imposed for compensation of women in unorganized
occupations; and the costs of goods and services would undoubtedly increase, thus further fueling the inflationary spiral. In short, Professor Blumrosen's theory, like the equal
value approach rejected in Lemons v. City & County of Denver, 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
906 (D. Colo. 1978), aff'd, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), No. 81, at D-1 (10th Cir. April
24, 1980), is "pregnant with the possibility of disrupting the entire economic system of
the United States of America." Id. at 907.
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any substantial legislative debate on that subject. This implausibility is magnified when one considers that the EPA, a statute
specifically addressed to remedying sex-based wage discrimination, is based in great part upon a legislative history that sharply
limits federal intrusion into wage structures. The argument that
Title VII may be invoked to equalize wage differentials is further
attenuated by the Bennett Amendment, 135 a statutory provision
which ties Title VII sex-based compensation claims to the "equal
work" standard of the EPA.

A.

Congressional Intent and the "Equal Work" Standard

I. The EPA - It is important to recall that both the EPA
and the Civil Rights Act of 1964, of which Title VII is a part,
were passed by consecutive sessions of the Eighty-eighth Congress. In every Congress since 1945, bills had been introduced
regarding pay parity for women. 138 The Eighty-eighth Congress
drew upon this background and took great pains to delineate the
standard under which sex-based compensation claims would be
examined under the EPA. Congress concluded that governmental intervention to equalize wage differentials was to be undertaken only within one set of circumstances: when men's and
women's jobs were identical or nearly so, hence unarguably of
equal worth. In order to sustain the Blumrosen theory, one must
believe that the same legislators who had so carefully
circumscribed legal intervention into compensation practices
under the EPA threw those restrictions to the winds one year later,
during the passage of Title VII, without any significant debate.
The legislative history of ·the EPA demonstrates the caution
that Congress expressed in adopting a wage discrimination standard. The debates showed overriding Congressional concern that
the EPA not be invoked by the government to mandate equality
of pay for jobs of different content and, concomitantly, a concern
that the latitude of administrators and courts in enforcing the
EPA be clearly circumscribed by the equal work wage discrimination standard. 137 "What we seek to ensure," Representative
Frelinghuysen explained, is "where men and women are doing
the same job under the same working conditions that they will
'" 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1976).
131
See e.g., Gitt & Gelb, Beyond the Equal Pay Act: Expanding Wage Differential
Protections Under Title VII, 8 Lov. U.L.J. (Chicago) 723, 734-42 (1977).
137
108 CONG. REc. 14747 (1962) (remarks of Rep. St. George); id. at 14768 (1962) (remarks of Rep. Landrum).
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receive the same pay." 138 He continued:
[T]he jobs in dispute must be the same in work content,
effort, skill, and responsibility requirements, and in working conditions. . . . [The EPA] is not intended to compare unrelated jobs; or jobs that have been historically
and normally considered by the industry to be different.
Violations usually will be apparent, and will almost always, occur in the same work area and where the same
tasks are performed. 139
Representative Goodell, who sponsored the bill that became
the EPA, echoed Representative Frelinghuysen's comments. He
noted that the bill as originally introduced had used the term
"comparable work" rather than "equal work." 140 The former
term, as Professor Blumrosen points out, 141 had a well-established connotation. During World War II, the regulations of the
National War Labor Board (NWLB) required equal pay for
"comparable work." Under these regulations, the Board had
made job evaluations to determine whether pay inequities existed within a plant between dissimilar jobs. 142 In substituting
the term "equal work" for "comparable work," Congress rejected the approach taken by the NWLB. Representative
Goodell stressed the significance of adopting an "equal work"
standard:
I think it is important that we have clear legislative history at this point. Last year when the House changed the
word "comparable" to "equal" the clear intention was to
narrow the whole concept. We went from "comparable"
to "equal" meaning that the jobs involved should be virtually identical, that is, they would be very much alike or
closely related to each other.
We do not expect the Labor Department to go into an
establishment and attempt to rate jobs that are not
'"' 109 CONG. REC. 9196 (1963) (remarks of Rep. Frelinghuysen) (emphasis supplied).
,.. Id.
"" 109 CoNG. REc. 9197 (1963).
"' Wage Discrimination, supra note 1, at 475.
"' See Angelo v. Bacharach Instrument Co., 555 F.2d 1164 (3d Cir. 19771; Shultz v.
Wheaton Glass Co., 421 F.2d 259 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 905 (1970).
It should be noted that the NWLB was not a judicial tribunal in any sense. It was a
tripartite body made up of public, industry, and labor representatives which had the
authority to resolve disputes only by mediation or arbitration. Its recommendations did
not have the force and effect of law, nor were they enforceable by court order. See National War Labor Board, Termination Report, Vol. I, pp. XXV-XXVI, 7, 10 (1945).
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equal. We do not want to hear the Department say,
"Well, they amount to the same thing," and evaluate
them so they come up to the same skill or point. We expect this to apply only to jobs that are substantially identical or equal. 143
Representative Goodell emphasized that the prime reason Congress had adopted the equal work standard in the EPA was to
insure that employers would "have a maximum degree of discretion" in working out how much employees should be paid. 14' Professor Blumrosen's article glosses over the legislative history of
the EPA, though it does note that the assumption "that Congress carefully drafted the EPA so that it would apply only to a
narrow set of circumstances" has "considerable validity." 145
2. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 - The care with
which Congress limited intervention into alleged wage discrimination based upon sex in the EPA contrasts sharply with its cursory treatment of the entire subject of sex discrimination during
the passage of Title VTI. In fact, the legislative history of the sex
· discrimination provision of Title VTI is almost nonexistent. 148
The House bill 147 that was ultimately enacted as the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 was intended primarily to secure the rights of
blacks. The bill went to the House floor for debate without any
consideration of a sex discrimination prohibition. 148 Debate on
the House floor lasted almost two weeks, from January 31, to
"' 109 CONG. REC. 9197 (1963) (remarks of Rep. Goodell). Representative Goodell's remarks as a sponsor of the legislation are entitled to great weight. See NLRB v. National
Woodwork Mfr's Ass'n, 386 U.S. 612, 629-31 (1967).
A dialogue between Representative Goodell and Representative Griffin further explained the concept of equal job content: ·
Mr. GOODELL: We are talking about jobs that involve the same quality, the
same size, the same number, where they do the same type of thing, with an
identity to them.
Mr. GRIFFIN: In addition, it would be clear that in comparing inspectors, if
one inspects a complicated part of an engine, for example, while another inspector makes only a cursory type of inspection, obviously, the fact that both are
inspectors would not mean they should necessarily receive equal pay.
Mr. GOODELL: I agree with the gentleman.
109 CONG. REc. at 9198.
'" Id. (remarks of Rep. Goodell).
5
"
Wage Discrimination, supra note 1, at 475.
"' The legislative history of Title VII's sex discrimination provision is "notable prima. rily for its brevity." General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 143 (1976). See also Wage
Discrimination, supra note 1, at 477-81.
1
"
H.R. REP. No. 7152, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964).
"" Kanowitz, Sex-Based Discrimination in American Law Ill: Title VII of the 1964
Civil Rights Act and the Equal Pay Act of 1963, 20 HAST. L.J. 305, 310 (1968); Miller,
Sex Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 51 MINN. L. REv. 877,
880 (1967).
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February 10, 1964. It was not until the final day that an amendment to prohibit sex discrimination was proposed as an attempt
to thwart passage of the bill. 149 The amendment was passed by
the House that same day, and the entire bill was approved two
days later and sent to the Senate without any consideration of
the effect of the amendment on the EPA.
The bill bypassed the Senate committee system and was
presented to the full Senate for initial consideration. It was not
until this time that concern was expressed about the relation of
the Title VII sex discrimination ban to the EPA. In response,
Senator Clark submitted a statement to the Senate which assured that" [t]he standards in the Equal Pay Act for determining
discrimination as to wages, of course, are applicable to the
comparable situation under title VIl." 150 Apparently not completely satisfied with this explanaton, Senator Bennett proposed
an amendment to section 703(h). The proffered amendment was
passed with very little debate, but Senator Bennett clearly stated
that "[t]he purpose of my amendment is to provide that in the
event of conflicts, the provisions of the Equal Pay Act shall not be
nullified. " 151
During consideration by the House of the Senate amendments
to the House hill, Congressman Celler was called upon to explain
the purpose of the Bennett Amendment. He stated that the Bennett Amendment "provides that compliance with the Fair Labor
Standards Act as amended [i.e., the EPA] satisfies the requirements of the title [Title VII] banning discrimination because of
sex."t52
The rather barren legislative history of the sex discrimination
provisions of Title VII evidences no intent by Congress to abandon the meticulously crafted, thoroughly debated limitations of
the EPA, adopted by the same Congress one year earlier. To the
contrary, the legislative history of the Bennett Amendment
shows Congressional reluctance to extend governmental regulation of wage differentials beyond the equal work standard of the
'" Representative Howard Smith of Virginia, Chairman of the House Rules Committee
and a powerful opponent of Title VIl and of all civil rights legislation, proposed the
amendment. For a discussion of Judge Smith's motives in proposing to amend Section
703(a) to prohibit sex discrimination, see Miller, supra note 148, at 880; Kanowitz, supra
note 148, at 310-13; Note, Employer Dress and Appearance Codes and Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 46 So. CAL. L. REv. 965, 968 (1973).
150
110 CoNG. REc. 7217 (1964). For further discussion of Senator Clark's memorandum,
see text accompanying note 162 infra.
1• 1 110 CoNG. REc. 13647 (1964).
••z Id. at 15896 (1964).
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EPA. 153 Thus, Professor Blumrosen's assertion that Title VII's
prohibition of job segregation affects wage differentials between
different jobs finds no support in the legislative history of Title
VII.
Moreover, Professor Blumrosen's comparable worth theory ignores one of the fundamental policies of the EPA, often expressed in the legislative history of that statute, that federal intervention in wage setting must not extend beyond equal work
situations. It should be added that a policy of limited governmental intrusion was operative in the enactment of Title VIl as
well, as was recently expressed by the Supreme Court in United
Steelworkers of America v. Weber: 154 "Title VIl could not have
The complete history of the Bennett Amendment is set forth below:
Mr. BENNETT. Mr. President, I yield myself 2 minutes . . .
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment will be stated.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
On page 44, line 15, immediately after the period, it is proposed to insert the
following new sentence: "It shall not be an unlawful employment practice under
this title for any employer to differentiate upon the basis of sex in determining
the amount of the wages or compensation paid or to be paid to employees of such
employer if such differentiation is authorized by the provisions of section 6(d) of
the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended (29 U.S.C. 206(d))."
Mr. BENNETT. Mr. President, after many years of yearning by members of
the fair sex in this country, and after very careful study by the appropriate committees of Congress, last year Congress passed the so-called Equal Pay Act,
which became effective only yesterday.
By this time, programs have been established for the effective administration
of this act. Now, when the civil rights bill is under consideration, in which the
word 'sex' has been inserted in many places, I do not believe sufficient attention
may have been paid to possible conflicts between the wholesale insertion of the
word 'sex' in the bill and in the Equal Pay Act.
The purpose of my amendment is to provide that in the event of conflicts, the
provisions of the Equal Pay Act shall not be nullified.
I understand that the leadership in charge of the bill have agreed to the
amendment as a proper technical correction of the bill. H they will confirm that
understand [sic), I shall ask that the amendment be voted on without asking for
the yeas and nays.
Mr. HUMPHREY. The amendment of the Senator from Utah is helpful. I believe it is needed. I thank him for his thoughtfulness. The amendment is fully
acceptable.
Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, I yield myself 1 minute.
We were aware of the conflict that might develop, because the Equal Pay Act
was an amendment to the Fair Labor Standards Act. The Fair Labor Standards
Act carries out certain exceptions.
All that the pending amendment does is recognize those exceptions, that are
carried in the basic act.
Therefore, this amendment is necessary, in the interest of clarification.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. (Mr. RIBICOFF in the chair). The question is on
agreeing to the amendment of the Senator from Utah. (Putting the question.)
The amendment was agreed to.
Id. at 13647.
,.. - U.S. -, 99 S.Ct. 2721 (1979).
153
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been enacted into law without substantial support from legislators in both Houses who traditionally resisted federal regulation
of private business. Those legislators demanded as a price for
their support that "management prerogatives and union freedoms . . . be left undisturbed to the greatest extent possible." 155
This policy of restricted federal intervention into the wage practices of employers would be eviscerated by the remedial approach proposed in Wage Discrimination. Virtually all employers
and workers, and their families, would experience changes in
their" real incomes if the Wage Discrimination theory became the
law.
Even if Title VII were susceptible to a broader interpretation·
than the EPA as regards sex-linked wage discrimination, the earlier statute should still control. Because the EPA is a specific law
regulating a particular area of congressional concern, sex-based
wage discrimination, it must prevail over a later statute, Title
VII, of general application to the same subject area. 158 Under this
well-established rule of statutory construction, and in view of the
legislative record of the two statutes dealing with sex dicriinination passed by the Eighty-eighth Congress, federal efforts to review wage discrimination claims, by whatever theoretical underpinnings, are governed by the EPA. This conclusion is further
supported by the statutory provision through which Congress
linked Title VII to the EPA, the Bennett Amendment.

B.

The Blumrosen Theory and the Bennett Amendment

1. The Bennett Amendment - The Bennett Amendment to
Title VII states that it is not illegal for an employer to differentiate in compensation on the basis of sex "if such differentiation is
authorized by the provisions of the [EPA]." 157 Professor Blum155
Id. at 2730 (citation omitted). For the pertinent legislative history, see H.R. REP.
No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 29 (1963).
151
See, e.g., Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974), where the Court held that Title
VII's race discrimination provision did not preclude enforcement of an earlier statute
giving hiring preference to Indians and stated: "Where there is no clear intention otherwise, a specific statute will not be controlled or nullified by a general one, regardless of
the priority of enactment." Id. at 550-51. Accord, Radzanower v. Touche-Ross & Co., 426
U.S. 148, 153 (1976) ("It is a basic principle of statutory construction that a statute dealing with a narrow, precise and specific subject is not submerged by a later enacted statute covering a more generalized spectrum."); Brown v. General Servs. Admin., 425 U.S.
820, 834 (1976) ("[A) precisely drawn, detailed statute pre-empts more general
remedies.").
157
The Bennett Amendment provides:
It shall not be an unlawful employment practice under this subchapter for any
employer to differentiate upon the basis of sex in determining the amount of
wages or compensation paid or to be paid to employees of such employer if such
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rosen concludes that the Bennett Amendment incorporates only
the EPA's four affirmative defenses 158 into Title VII but does not
also impose the EPA's "equal work" standard upon Title VII as
the sole basis for sex-based compensation claims. In reaching
this conclusion, she overlooks both the language of Section
703(h) and significant legislative history of Title VII and the
EPA, and she misapprehends relevant court decisions.
2. The effect of section 703(h) on the purpose of the Bennett
Amendment - The EPA contains four statutory exceptions or
defenses. But Title VII's section 703(h), which the Supreme
Court has recognized as a "definitional provision," 159 already
contained those defenses when Senator Bennett offered his
"technical correction." 180 The opening sentence of section 703(h)
protected differentials in compensation based on seniority,
merit, or quantity or quality of production. These were three of
the four EPA defenses. The fourth EPA defense, "a factor other
than sex," was already implicit in Title VII because the statute's
prohibition of sex discrimination applies only if there is discrimination on the basis of sex. Thus, Professor Blumrosen's assertion
that the purpose of the Bennett Amendment was to incorporate
the EPA defenses is unpersuasive. The four defenses were already available under Title VII when Senator Bennett proposed
his amendment. Under such an interpretation the amendment
would be mere surplusage.
3. Applicability of the EPA standard to sex-based wage
claims under Title VII - Wage Discrimination's discussion of
the Bennett Amendment is sparse and selective, especially in its
use of legislative history surrounding that provision. The article
differentiation is authorized by the provisions of Section 206(d) of Title 29 [Fair
Labor Standards Act of 1938 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1976) (emphasis added).
151
The Equal Pay Act's four affirmative defenses permit different compensation if the
differential is made by way of (a) a seniority system, (b) a merit system, (c} a system
which measures earnings by quantity or quality of production, or (d) a differential based
on any other factor than sex. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(l) (1976).
••• See, e.g., Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 82 (1977); International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 346-47 (1977); Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., Inc., 424 U.S. 747, 758 (1976).
1
'° The first clause of § 703(h) states:
(h) Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, it shall not be an
unlawful employment practice for an employer to apply different standards of
compensation, or different terms, conditions, or privileges of employment pursuant to a bona fide seniority or merit system, or a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of production or to employees who work in different
locations, provided that such differences are not the result of an intention to
discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin .
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1976) (emphasis added).
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also overlooks other legislative statements, made during consideration of Title VII, which recognized the potential conflict between Title VII and the EPA and which resolved that conflict in
favor of the EPA's standards.
a. Senator Bennett's written interpretation. In the 1965 congressional session following passage of the Civil Rights Act, Senator Bennett read into the Congressional Record his interpretation of the amendment to section 703(h) that he had sponsored
the previous year.' 81 The Senator expressed his concern because a
law review article had asserted, as does Professor Blumrosen,
that there were two possible interpretations of the amendment. 182
Senator Bennett noted that the article suggested the possibility
that the amendment merely incorporated into Title VII the
EPA's affirmative defenses, and stated that: "[The language setting out the defenses] is merely clarifying language similar to
that which was already in section 703(h). If the Bennett Amendment was simply intended to incorporate by reference these exceptions into subsection (h), the amendment would have no substantive effect." 183
The author of the law review article had noted the "more
plausible" interpretation to be that, if the amendment is to be
given any effect, "it must be interpreted to mean that discrimination in compensation on account of sex does not violate Title
VII unless it also violates the Equal Pay Act. " 184 In order to resolve the matter, Senator Bennett offered his written
interpretation:
The amendment therefore means that it is not an unlawful employment practice: . . . (b) to have different standards of compensation for nonexempt employees, where
such differentiation is not prohibited by the equal pay
amendment to the Fair Labor Standards Act.
Simply stated, the [Bennett] amendment means that
discrimination in compensation on account of sex does
not violate title VII unless it also violates the Equal Pay
Act.1ss
111 CoNG. REc. 13359-13360 (1965).
Indeed, Professor Blumrosen posits three possible interpretations of the Bennett
Amendment. Wage Discrimination, supra note 1, at 481-82. The law review article referred to in 111 CONG. REC. 13359 (1965) is Berg, Equal Employment Opportunity Under
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 31 BROOKLYN L. REV. 62 (1964).
11• 111 CoNG. REc. 13359 (1965).
"' Id.
,.. Id. (emphasis added). Senator Dirksen agreed that this interpretation was the one
that he, Senator Humphrey, and their staffs had in mind when the Senate adopted the
111

112
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b. The Clark memorandum. Following House passage of the
bill which became the Civil Rights Act of 1964, including the· sex
discrimination provision, and after the bill had been debated for
three weeks in the Senate, Senator Clark, one of the bill's floor
managers, prepared a memorandum which was read into the
Congressional Record to answer questions and respond to objections that had been raised concerning the meaning of Title VII.
One of these explanations, memorializing a colloquy between
Senators Dirksen and Clark, clearly states that Congress intended to preserve EPA standards under the Civil Rights bill:
Objection: The sex antidiscrimination provisions of the
bill duplicate the coverage of the Equal Pay Act of 1963.
But more than this, they extend far beyond the scope and
coverage of the Equal Pay Act. They do not include the
limitations in that act with respect to equal work on jobs
requiring equal skills in the same establishments, and
thus, cut across different jobs.
Answer: The Equal Pay Act is a part of the wage hour
law, with different coverage and with numerous exemptions unlike title VII. Furthermore, under Title VII, jobs
can no longer be classified as to sex, except where there is
a rational basis for discrimination on the ground of bona
fide occupational qualification. The standards in the
Equal Pay Act for determining discrimination as to
wages, of course, are applicable to the comparable situation under Title Vll. 166
Professor Blumrosen cites this passage of the Clark memorandum as evidence that Congress recognized that the EPA does not
cover most single-sex jobs. 187 As far as it goes, one cannot quarrel
with her deduction. Clearly, however, the memorandum also
demonstrates a congressional intent to treat job segregation and
wage discrimination as separate problems. With respect to Title
VII's proscription of "discrimination as to wages," Congress intended that Title VII not go beyond the limits of the EPA. Moreover, Senator Clark's explanation cannot be restricted, as Professor Blumrosen has argued, to mean that the EPA equal work
standard would apply to Title VII only when conduct that would
violate the EPA also was alleged to violate Title VII. The Clark
Bennett Amendment. Id. at 13360 (1965). He added: "I trust that that will suffice to
clear up in the minds of anyone, whether in the Department of Justice or elsewhere, what
the Senate intended when that amendment was accepted." Id.
'" 110 CONG. REc. 7217 (1964) (emphasis added).
117
Wage Discrimination, supra note 1, at 478.

274

Journal of Law Reform

[VOL. 13:2

memorandum plainly expressed the concern that Title VII might
be construed as prohibiting unequal pay when different jobs were
involved. Senator Clark's reply indicates that when different jobs
were at issue, the EPA's legal standards would apply to limit the
reach of Title Vil. This limitation would be rendered meaningless if the Wage Discrimination theory were adopted and a prima
facie case of wage discrimination could be made out on the mere
showing that a plaintiff occupied a job traditionally held by
women.
c. · The Celler statement. After the Senate added amendments to the Civil Rights Act of 1964, including the Bennett
Amendment, it returned the bill to the House. Wage Discrimination fails to note that during these House deliberations, Representative Celler, the bill's original sponsor and floor leader in the
House, set out in the record the understanding of the House that
sex-based compensation claims would not satisfy Title Vil unless
they met the EPA's standards. He stated that the Bennett
Amendment: "[p]rovides that compliance with the EPA satisfies
the requirement of the title barring discrimination because of sex
- Section [703(h)]. " 188 Representative Celler's statement that
compliance with the EPA satisfies the requirements of Title VII
recognized, as have the courts, 189 that differences in compensation that do not violate the EPA are "authorized" by the Bennett Amendment for purposes of Title VII.
d. The contemporaneous administrative interpretation. Consistent with Representative Celler's and Senator Bennett's interpretation of section 703(h), and Senator Clark's explanation of
the intended interaction between Title VII and the EPA in the
area of sex-linked wage discrimination, is the EEOC'.s contemporaneous interpretation of the amendment, published in 1965.
The Commission stated at that time that:
(a) Title Vil requires that its provisions be harmonized
with the Equal Pay Act . . . in order to avoid conflicting
interpretations or requirements with respect to situations
to which both statutes are applicable. Accordingly, the
Commission interprets Section 703(h) to mean that the
standards of "equal pay for equal work" set forth in the
Equal Pay Act for determining what is unlawful discrimination in compensation are applicable to Title VII. 170
"' 110 CONG. REC. 15896 (1964) (emphasis added).
'" See text accompanying notes 175-77 infra.
170 29 C.F.R. § 1604.7 (1965) (emphasis added).
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Although the 1965 EEOC interpretation of the impact of the
Bennett Amendment was dropped in 1972, when the agency issued a new interpretation that the Bennett Amendment's purpose was only to incorporate the EPA's defenses in Title VII
wage suits, 171 the Supreme Court has stated on several occasions
that EEOC interpretations and guidelines which were promulgated contemporaneously with the enactment of Title VII should
be accorded more weight than those issued in later years. 172
Thus congressional history, even as interpreted by the EEOC
in 1965, provides no support for the theory asserted in Wage Discrimination that the federal courts can be thrust into a massive
reorganization of the American economy. Among Congress' reasons for adopting the "equal work" concept, in both Title VII
and the EPA, were that it was less vague than the "comparable
work" approach and that it would not inject federal regulators
and the courts into these areas. 173
4. The case law - Nearly every court that has addressed the
issue has held that Title Vll wage discrimination claims are coterminous with EPA claims. The "equal work" standard has
been followed, as a limitation upon wage discrimination claims
under Title VII, by the Supreme Court174 and by seven federal
171
In 1972, the EEOC changed its interpretation to eliminate the language of the 1965
interpretation and substitute the following:
(a) The employee coverage of the prohibitions against discrimination based
on sex contained in title VIl is co-extensive with that of the other prohibitions
contained in title VII and is not limited by section 703(hl to those employees
covered by the Fair Labor Standards Act.
(b) By virtue of section 703(h), a defense based on the Equal Pay Act may be
raised in a proceeding under title Vil.
(c) Where such a defense is raised the Commission will give appropriate consideration to the interpretations of the Administrator, Wage and Hour Division,
Department of Labor, but will not be bound thereby.
29 C.F.R. § 1604.8 (1979) (emphasis added).
171
See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 76 n.11 (1977); General
Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 142-45 (1976). It is likely that the courts will continue
to give little weight to the 1972 EEOC guideline in wage comparability cases. As the
Court noted in Trans World Airlines, Inc., "(A)n EEOC guideline is not entitled to great
weight where . . . it varies from prior EEOC policy and no new legislative history has
been introduced in support of the change." 432 U.S. at 76 n.11.
"' See text accompanying notes 142-43 supra.
"' General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976). In Gilbert the Court held that an
employer's exclusion of benefits for disability during pregnancy was not a violation of
Title VII. One of the Court's grounds for its decision was a recognition that conduct that
would otherwise violate § 703(a) of Title VIl was protected by the Bennett Amendment
because the conduct did not violate the EPA's prohibitions. Id. at 144-45.
The 1978 pregnancy disability amendment to Title VII amended § 701(kl, 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-2(k), to state that discrimination because of sex would include the failure to pay
female employees maternity-related disability payments. Significantly, the amendment
also provided that "nothing in section 703(h) of this title shall be interpreted to permit
otherwise." As the House report stated:
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courts of appeals, 175 as well as by numerous trial courts. 178 These
This disclaimer was necessitated ·by the Supreme Court's reliance in the Gilbert case on Section 703(h) of Title VII ("the Bennett Amendment") which in
effect provides that certain practices authorized by the [EPA) do not violate Title VII. The Court in Gilbert noted that a regulation issued under the Equal Pay
Act [by the Wage and Hour Administration] provides that certain gender-based
. differentiations do not violate the [EPA) . . . . While the Gilbert opinion is
somewhat vague as to the pertinence of this regulation, it does appear that the
Court regarded the Bennett amendment and the Equal Pay Act regulat~on,
taken together, as somehow insulating pregnancy-based classifications from the
proscriptions of Title VII.
Therefore, the committee determined that it was necessary to expressly remove the Bennett amendment from the pregnancy issue in order to assure the
equal treatment of pregnant workers.
H.R. REP. No. 95-948, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1978), reprinted in [1978) U.S. CooE CoNG.
& AoMIN. NEWS 4749, 4755.
175
Lemons v. City & County of Denver, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), No. 81, at D-1 (10th
Cir. April 24, 1980); Marshall v. Dallas Independent School Dist., 21 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
143 (5th Cir. 1979); DiSalvo v. Chamber of Commerce, 568 F.2d 593 (8th Cir. 1978); Laffey
v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 567 F.2d 429 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086
0978); Calage v. University of Tennessee, 544 F.2d 297 (6th Cir. 1976); Keyes v. Lenoir
Rhyne College, 552 F.2d 579 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 904 (1977); Orr v. Frank
R. McNeill & Son, Inc., 511 F.2d 166 (5th Cir.) cert. denied, 423 U.S. 856 (1975); Ammons
v. Zia Co., 448 F.2d 117 (10th Cir. 1971); Shultz v. Wheaton Glass Co., 421 F.2d 259 (3d
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 905 (1970).
But see Gunther v. County ofWashington, 602 F.2d 882 (9th Cir. 1979). Although
plaintiffs in Gunther were allowed to proceed under a Title VII wage discrimination theory, the court stated that absent a showing of "equal work" the burden of proof still
remained on the plaintiffs to show on remand that "some of the discrepancy in _wages was
due to sex discrimination." Id. at 888.
Cases such as Los Angeles Dep't of Power & Water v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978),
and Laffey v. Northwest Air Lines, Inc., 567 F.2d 429 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 1086 (1978), relied upon by Professor Blumrosen to support the position that the
Bennett Amendment is not a barrier to a broad application of Title VII to remedy
residual wage differentials, are inapposite. In Manhart, the Supreme Court was concerned only with defining the "factor other than sex" defense of the EPA. In that case,
male and female employees were "identically situated," Manhart v. Los Angeles Dep't of
Power & Water, 553 F.2d 581, 583 (9th Cir. 1976), so the Supreme Court was not confronted with the issue that Professor Blumrosen raises, viz., whether a Title VII wage
discrimination claim is broader than the EPA. Similarly, in Laffey the actual jobs being
compared were substantially equal (stewardesses and pursers). The Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia emphasized that Title VII was not intended to supplant the
EPA in cases involving sex-based wage discrimination claims, stating:
Although Title VII reaches farther than the Equal Pay Act to protect groups
other than those sex-based classes and to proscribe discrimination in many facets
of employment additional to compensation, nowhere have we encountered an indication that Title VII was intended either to supplant or be supplanted by the
Equal Pay Act in the relatively small area in which the two are congruent. On
the contrary, we are satisfied that the provisions of both acts should be read in
pari materia, and neither should be interpreted in a manner that would undermine the other. In Orr u. Frank R. McNeil! & Son, Inc., the Fifth Circuit declared that "[t)he sex discrimination provision of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 must be construed in harmony with the Equal Pay Act of 1963." We
agree, and we now so hold.
567 F.2d at 445-46 (footnote omitted).
"' EEOC v. Ball Corp., Case No. C76-31 (N.D. Ohio 1979); Marshall v. A&M Consolidated School Dist., 21 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 134 (S.D. Tex. 1979); Johnson v. University
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courts have ruled that Title VII and the EPA must be construed
in pari materia. Although Congress limited the scope of sexbased compensation claims in the EPA, it guaranteed women
equal access to jobs in Title VII by forbidding discrimination in
hiring, job placement or classification, promotions, transfers,
layoffs, and discharges. 177 The two statutes provide a balanced
approach to sex discrimination, setting forth a scheme that guarantees qualified female employees access to all jobs while, at the
same time, assuring that the courts and federal agencies will not
become entangled in setting wage rates.
The theory that Title VII overrides the EPA would entangle
the courts in a hopeless morass of wage claim litigation. The judicial entanglement would be exacerbated by the fact that labor
law has left the substance of collective bargaining to the parties
and not the government, 178 and so the courts have had little experience in setting wage rates. It should also be noted that alof Bridgeport, 20 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1766, 1769-70 (D. Conn. 1979); JUE v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 450 (D.N.J. 1979), appeal pending, Nos. 791893 & 1894 (3d Cir.); Kohne v. Imco Container Co., 20 Empl. Prac. Dec. 'II 30,168 (W.D.
Va. 1979); Lemons v. City & County of Denver, 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 906 (D. Colo.
1978), aff'd, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), No. 81, at D-1 (10th Cir. April 24, 1980); Wetzel
v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 449 F. Supp. 397, 407 (W.D. Pa. 1978); JUE v. Westinghouse
Elec. Corp., 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 16 (N.D. W. Va. 1977); Molthan v. Temple Univ., 420
F. Supp. 448 (E.D. Pa. 1977); Chrapliwy v. Uniroyal, Inc., 15 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 795
(N.D. Ind. 1977); Patterson v. Western Development Labs, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 772,
775-76 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
177 The general policy considerations for regarding the EPA and Title VII in pari
materia are cogently summarized by the court in Kohne v. Imco Container Co., 20 Empl.
Prac. Dec. 'II 30,168 (W.D. Va. 1979), as follows:
Of course, sound policy underlies such a construction. Congress did not intend to
put either the Secretary of Labor or the courts in the business of evaluating jobs
and in determining what constitutes a proper differential for unequal work . . . .
Sufficient remedies exist under Title VII to deal with discriminatory hiring and
promotional practices, without the courts becoming embroiled in determinations
of how an employer's work force ought to be paid.
Id. at 11,876 (citations omitted).
"" See H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99 (19701. In Porter, the Court held that the
National Labor Relations Board had exceeded its remedial powers by ordering the employer to grant to the union a contract clause providing for checkoff of union dues. The
Court stated:
The Board's remedial powers under§ 10 of the Act [29 U.S.C. § 160) are broad,
but they are limited to carrying out the policies of the Act itself. One of these
fundamental policies is freedom of contract. While the parties' freedom of contract is not absolute under the Act, allowing the Board to compel agreement
when the parties themselves are unable to agree would violate the fundamental
premise on which the Act is based - private bargaining under governmental
supervision of the procedure alone, without any official compulsion over the actual terms of the contract.
Id. at 108 (emphasis added). Under the Wage Discrimination theory, the government
would seek judicially mandated wage rates for most female workers in the economy, a
momentous step from "governmental supervision of procedure alone" amounting to "official compulsion" of substantive contractual provisions.
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though Congress adopted the "equal work" approach in the EPA
because it was narrower and less vague than other alternatives,
"the federal courts have had no small difficulty" in attempting
to apply even this standard. 179 The adoption of the Wage Discrimination theory would make the federal courts' responsibility
even more extensive and place upon the judicial system a significant burden not intended by Congress. In the words of Mr. Justice Rehnquist, in the recent case of Furnco Construction Corp.
v. Waters:' 80 "Courts are generally less competent than employers to restructure business practices, and unless mandated to do
so by Congress they should not attempt it."

III.

THE

Wage Discrimination

THEORY AND STANDARDS OF
PROOF

With respect to standards of proof, Professor Blumrosen's theory contains two fatal defects. The first defect is in the creation
and the operation of the theory's "triggering mechanism," a presumption of wage discrimination which is established merely by
showing that a plaintiff works in a job traditionally performed by
women. The second defect is that the proposed method of proof
contravenes the established methods of proof under Title VII as
to the construction of a prima facie case and as to the available
defenses.

A.

An Examination of the Wage Discrimination Presumption

All proponents of the comparable worth movement agree that
the law ought to prohibit wage discrimination. Professor Blumrosen goes beyond others in her unique proposal for the method
of proof. She implicitly recognizes the difficulty - or impossibility - of demonstrating wage discrimination in any particular instance. To enable the plaintiffs to recover, she proposes that they
, not be required to prove wage discrimination. She argues that
the plaintiffs need only show that they work in a job that is or
was predominantly female. In such jobs wage discrimination is
so nearly universal, Professor Blumrosen believes, that the law
should draw the inference of wage discrimination from the bare
fact of female predominance.
1. The presumption would be irrebuttable - The key to Professor Blumrosen's establishment of a prima facie case of wage
discrimination is an "inference" - that is, a presumption - of
Angelo v. Bacharach Instrument Co., 555 F.2d 1164, 1170 (3d Cir. 1977).
'"' 438 U.S. 567, 578 (19781.

171
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wage discrimination to be created by showing that the plaintiff's
job has traditionally been female- or minority-intensive. 181 This
inference supposedly follows from the historical, anthropological,
sociological, and ecpnomic studies outlined in Part I of Wage Discrimination. 182 This article has concentrated predominantly on
the problems associated with the creation of Professor Blumrosen's presumption of wage discrimination from the sexual identification of particular occupations in the American economy. As
demonstrated in part II of the present article, this presumption
would rest upon a very unstable foundation of social science evidence. As shown in part ill, the presumption has no antecedents
in Title VII's legislative history. Substantial problems would also
exist, however, in the operation of this presumption in the
courts.
Under the Wage Discrimination theory "[t]o make a prima facie case of wage discrimination . . . a plaintiff should have to
show only that the job has been and/or is presently identified as
a minority or female job." 183 The article asserts that a showing of
job segregation may. be accomplished entirely by statistics,
merely by showing that seventy percent or more of the occupants
of the job are women or minorities, 184 and states: "Such a showing would demonstrate that a depressed wage was one of the ad'"' "The establishment of present or past job segregation thus should create an inference of wage discrimination sufficient to constitute a prima facie case." Wage Discrimination, supra note 1, at 459.
••• Impassable evidentiary barriers would prevent courts from drawing such an inference. As discussed in part I supra, the studies cited by Professor Blumrosen do not speak
in a united voice regarding the causes of wage differences. Nor do these sources agree as
to whether some fraction of the "earnings gap" between men and women is attributable
to wage discrimination. Thus, Wage Discrimination and its sources are hardly subjects
appropriate for judicial notice. See FRE 201. Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, facts
appropriate for judicial notice must be (1) not subject to reasonable dispute, or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. FRE 201(b). The studies cited in Wage Discrimination are
neither. See also Alvary v. United States, 302 F.2d 790, 794 (2d Cir. 1962) (fact must be
capable of ready verification); Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hughes, 308 F. Supp. 679,
684 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), modified, 449 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1971), rev'd on other grounds, 409
U.S. 363 (1973); 1 WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE , 201(03] (1978).
Professor Blumrosen does not discuss how the courts might be persuaded that her key
inference is valid. Certainly the proposition that job separation implies wage discrimination cannot be proved by introduction into evidence of her article or the materials cited
in that article. Such documents would be inadmissible hearsay. FRE 801-806.
To persuade courts of the validity of Professor Blumrosen's proposed inference would
require testimony by expert witnesses such as the economists, anthropologists, and other
social scientists whom Blumrosen selectively cites. The fact that none of these social
scientists has ever proposed the Blumrosen theory, much less claimed that the evidence
exists to sustain it, suggests that the theory would have a dim future in the courts.
183
Wage Discriminat_ion, supra note 1, at 459.
,., Id. at 460-62.
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verse effects of job segregation prohibited by Section 703(a)(2).
The demonstration of such a wage rate would also establish a
violation of Section 703(a)(l)." 185
Under this theory, a plaintiff would not need to show that his
or her wage rate would have been higher in the absence of job
separation. 186 The burden of proof would shift to the employer,
who has "unique access to, possession of, and control over this
evidence. " 187 The employer's defense would be impossible in
nearly all cases because Wage Discrimination prescribes that the
employer may not defend a wage structure on the ground that
the pay simply reflects the market value of jobs. Wage Discrimination specifies that, "absent a showing to the contrary, the
market rate reflects discriminatory factors . . . . " 188 Nor can the
employer rely on a job evaluation system to sustain its burden of
proof unless a successful demonstration can be made that the
system is free of discriminatory factors. 189 Wage Discrimination's
elaborate discussion of job evaluation systems makes a convincing case that such systems are by nature highly subjective.
Hence, proof of freedom from bias would be impossible. As was
discussed in part I of this article, economists are agreed that the
marginal productivity of most jobs is indeterminable. Market
rates, job evaluation systems, and marginal productivity analysis
are the only possible scales an employer could use to defend its
wage structure. Professor Blumrosen would rule out the first two
as infected with bias, and the third does not exist except in the
abstract calculus of microeconomic theory. The Wage Discrimination idea is thus a plaintiffs lawyer's dream: a simple counting of noses establishes the prima facie case, shifting the burden
of proof to the employer, and all methods of defense by which
the employer might attempt to meet its burden of proof are effectively ruled out. In reality, the presumption Professor Blumrosen has created would be an irrebuttable one.
2. The presumption cuts too broadly - Another problem
with the presumption of wage discrimination concerns its application to a particular employer's workforce. It is well documented that many women, for personal and cultural reasons,
lack interest in certain types of jobs. Their preferences contribute to the concentration of women in traditional occupations.
When the percentage of women in a job approaches the seventy
"'
•••
'"'
'"'
•••

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at

459.
466-68.
468.
488.
489.
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percent standard that Wage Discrimination sets forth as establishing a prima facie case, should the employer refuse to hire any
additional women? Should the employer discriminatorily assign
women who seek a traditional women's job to a "non-segregated"
(less than seventy-percent female) job category? Even if Professor Blumrosen's inference that job separation equals wage discrimination is generally true, it may be quite mistaken in any
specific case. Wage Discrimination gives the courts no way to
discern when, if ever, the inference of wage discrimination is justified and when it is not.

B.

The Wage Discrimination Theory and Established Title
VII Methods of Proof

The undoing of the Wage Discrimination theory is the very
ease with which it would establish a prima facie case. In effect,
the theory mistakenly places the burden of proof upon employers
to disprove discrimination. As shown below, this scheme is contrary to the established Title VII methods of proof.
Under Title VII, two primary theories of discrimination, and
thus two methods of proof, are available to private party plaintiffs: disparate treatment and disparate impact.1 90 The disparate
treatment theory was first used, and is still primarily used, in
individual actions. The disparate impact analysis, on the other
hand, evolved from large-scale class actions in which plaintiffs
alleged that particular employment selection criteria had a detrimental impact on a class of persons protected by Title VII.
A disparate treatment case focuses on discriminatory motives
behind the employer's action. Although the focus is on motive,
the plaintiff need not prove intent. Rather, the claimant must
initially prove that certain factors exist that would lead one to
infer that the employer's decision was illegally motivated.1 91 The

''° A third method of proof, demonstration of a pattern or practice of discrimination, is
available to the federal government in suits prosecuted under § 707 of Title VII. 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-6 (1976).
·
"' In International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977), the Court
defined the disparate treatment method of proof as follows:
"Disparate treatment" such as alleged in the present case is the most easily understood type of discrimination. The employer simply treats some people less
favorably than others because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Proof of discriminatory motive is critical, although it can in some situations be
inferred from the mere fact of differences in treatment.
Id. at 335 n.15. Although it has not been held that the plaintiff proceeding under a disparate treatment theory is required to submit direct proof of an unlawful motivation, the
plaintiff must present a prima facie case of discrimination from which one can reasonably
infer that the result in question was intended. See, e.g., Fumco Constr. Corp. v. Waters,
438 U.S. 567 (1978); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). For a dis-
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burden of proof is flexible, but the general principle is that the
plaintiff must carry "the initial burden of offering evidence adequate to create an inference that an employment decision was
based on a discriminatory criterion illegal under the Act. " 192
Once the plaintiff has established a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant to present evidence of some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its decision. 193 Following such
a showing, the plaintiff must produce evidence that the defendant's claimed legitimate reasons are merely a pretext for an underlying discriminatory motive. If the supposed legitimate reasons are a pretext, the employer's action is illegal. 194
Under the disparate impact theory, first enunciated in Griggs
u. Duke Power Company, 195 a prima facie case is established by
demonstration that an employment practice, neutral on its face,
has an adverse impact upon one or more of the classes of individuals protected under Title VII. No showing of discriminatory intent or unequal treatment is required; instead the focus is upon
the consequences of a particular employment practice. 196
Once a disparate impact is established, the employer carries
the burden of proving that the specific practice at issue is justified by business necessity.
1. Disparate treatment under the Wage Discrimination theory - Professor Blumrosen expects her theory to adhere largely
to Title VII methods of proof under the disparate treatment
standard in individual, non-class cases. She admits that "in a
cussion of motive in Title VII cases, see generally A. Blumrosen, Strangers No More: All
Workers Are Entitled to "Just Cause" Protection Under Title VII, 2 !Nous. REL. L.J. 519
(1978); B. 8CHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 1153-54 (1976).
112
International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 358 (1977).
113
See, e.g., Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (19781; Board of Trustees of
Keene State College v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24 (1978).
'" McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
19
• 401 U.S. 424 (1971). In Griggs, the Court was faced with the question of whether an
employer was prohibited by Title VII from requiring a high school education or the passing of a standardized general intelligence test as a condition of employment in or transfer
to jobs when: (a) neither standard was shown to be significantly related to successful job
performance; (b I both requirements operated to disqualify blacks at a substantially
higher rate than white applicants; and (c) the jobs in question formerly had been filled
only by white employees as part of a long-standing practice of giving preference to
whites. Id. at 425-26. hi this landmark decision, the Court ruled that if an employment
practice which operates to exclude blacks cannot be shown to be related to job performance, the practice is prohibited by Title VII. Id. at 431.
"' Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971). For example, both Griggs and
the later case of Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975), dealt with employment tests. In these cases, the Court held that in order to establish a prima facie case of
discrimination, plaintiffs had only to establish that the tests in question, although
facially neutral, caused the selection for hire or promotion in a racial pattern significantly
or substantially different from the pool of available applicants. See note 195 supra.
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non-class action individual case charging discrimination in compensation based only on a theory of disparate treatment, the
plaintiff would have to show that the depressed wage was racially or sexually motivated." 197 Even in the individual disparate
treatment case under Professor Blumrosen's theory, the plaintiff
would have to make a statistical showing that his or her job is or
once was race- or sex-segregated in order to activate the inference of wage discrimination. With respect to Wage Discrimina. tion's suggestion that statistical evidence alone could establish
the necessary discriminatory motive under a disparate treatment
theory, the article fails to take into account the lack of consensus
under Title VII as to the extent to which classwide evidence
should be considered probative in an action brought by a single
person. 198
2. Disparate impact and the Wage Discrimination theory Wage Discrimination never explicitly states in one place that its
theory that job segregation implies wage discrimination is
merged with a disparate impact analysis. It is clear that a disparate impact approach is intended. 199 To mold the idea that job
separation establishes a prima facie case of wage discrimination
into disparate impact terms, it would have to be argued that the
employer's wage structure is a facially neutral employment practice that promotes consequences yiolative of Title VII by its adverse impact upon the wages of women and minorities in femaleor minority-intensive jobs.
The application of a disparate impact method of proof to the
job segregation-wage discrimination theory is specious. Under
past employment discrimination cases, a disparate impact approach has been applied to specific employment practices such
as testing policies,· college degree hiring requirements, hiring exclusions of applicants who had arrest records, and discharge
rules based upon garnishments. 200 Wage Discrimination does not
"' Wage Discrimination, supra note 1, at 460.
"' See, e.g., Davis v. Califano, 21 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 272 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (statistical evidence may be used to establish an individual plaintiff's prima facie case). But see
McFadden v. Baltimore Steamship Trade Ass'n, 5 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 300 (D.C. Md.),
aff'd, 6 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 599 (4th Cir. 1973) (an individual plaintiff may not use
statistics, but must present evidence of specific acts of racial discrimination against him
in order to establish prima facie case); accord, Harper v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 525
F.2d 409, 412-14 (8th Cir. 1975); King v. Yellow Freight System, Inc., 523 F.2d 879, 882
(8th Cir. 1975).
'" Wage Discrimination, supra note 1, at 463.
zoo See, e.g., Wallace v. Debron Corp., 494 F.2d 674 (8th Cir. 1974) (employer policy
requiring discharge for two garnishments within 12 months held a prima facie violation of
. Title VII); Spurlock v. United Airlines, Inc., 475 F.2d 216 (10th Cir. 1972) (requirement
of college degree for pilots is job related); Johnson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 349 F.
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propose a disparate impact analysis of a specific employer practice but rather a wholesale assault on the employer's wage
structure.
One suspects that the difficulty Professor Blumrosen encounters in elucidating how this wage discrimination approach is
to be applied under a disparate impact method of proof stems
largely from her article's quicksilver use of the term "job segregation." On the one hand, she applies the term as it has historically been used in Title VIl case law: the intentional segregation
of occupations by sex or race. On the other hand, she uses "job
segregation" to denote the lingering presence of traditional
women's jobs or minorities' jobs, no longer intentionally segregated, but disproportionately populated by members of these
groups. This phenomenon might be termed "transitional" job
separation, no longer intentional in most cases, but unavoidable
in a period in which "the time lag in wage rate revision means
that for most of those jobs the wage structure still reflects the
depressed rate which was associated with its segregated character. "201 Professor Blumrosen supports her argument' by exploiting
the ambiguity in this double-jointed definition of "job segregation." She buttresses her contention that the Title VII standard
of proof (that a plaintiff need not prove the amount he or she
would have earned in the absence of discrimination) should apply in wage discrimination suits by citing several cases in which
discriminatory job assignments or the existence of segregated job
classifications were held to establish a prima facie violation of
Title VII without a demonstration of economic harm. 202 But in
these cases the plaintiffs had clearly demonstrated that the defendants had discriminatorily assigned them to lower status positions. The courts have long held that plaintiffs in cases of discriminatory assignments do not have to submit evidence of lower
pay as an element of their prima facie case. 203 These decisions,
however, do not support the argument that, where "transitional
job separation" is combined with the absence of a discriminatory
Supp. 3 (S.D. Tex. 1972), aff'd, 491 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir. 1974) (high school diploma not
job related}; Gregory v. Litton Systems, Inc., 316 F. Supp. 491, af/'d, 472 F.2d 631 (9th
Cir. 1972) (policy of excluding applicants with arrest records violates Title VII).
201 Wage Discrimination, supra note 1, at 460.
202 Id. at 463-65. Among these cases are Swint v. Pullman-Standard, 539 F.2d 77 (5th
Cir. 1976) (discrimination in job assignments established prima facie case); James v.
Stockham Valves & Fittings Co., 559 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1977) (discriminatory job assignments and segregated facilities violated Title VII); Reed v. Arlington Hotel Co., Inc., 476
F.2d 721 (8th Cir. 1973) (maintenance of segregated job classifications established Title
VII violation).
203 Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., Inc., 424 U.S. 747 (1976); Swint v. Pullman-Standard, 539 F.2d 77, 90 (5th Cir. 1976).
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assignment, a wage discrimination plaintiff need not show economic disparity, but only that her job contains over seventy percent women, in order to demonstrate a prima facie violation of
Title VII.
It is clear that Professor Blumrosen uses the term "job segregation," in both of its definitions, as a mechanism to pull wage
discrimination into the remedial ambit of Title VII. Her article
is unconcerned with past Title VII remedies for job segregation,
e.g., hires, transfers, and promotions into higher status jobs,
which it terms inadequate; the article seeks more money for individuals who stay in the traditional jobs. Professor Blumrosen
views the problem of wage discrimination as one of the "discriminatory radiations from job segregation." 204 The chief problem
here is that Congress intended either to deal with these problems
separately or, more charitably to Professor Blumrosen's view,
never made the linkage between the problems at all. From the
existing legislative history, it certainly appears that Congress intended to remedy wage discrimination through the EPA standards, whether suit is brought under that statute or under Title
VII. 205 The result is that the disparate impact approach of Title
VII is inapplicable to wage compensation suits.
3. Title VII wage discrimination cases - All Title VII wage
discrimination decisions have placed the burden of proof upon
the plaintiff to demonstrate that the wage inequity was the result of prohibited discrimination.
In the leading case in this area, Christensen v. Iowa, 208 the
plaintiffs were female clerical workers who received less pay than
physical plant workers, who were primarily male, for dissimilar
work of equal value to their employer. The plaintiffs claimed
that they were victims of sex-based compensation discrimination
prohibited by Title VII. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that apart from considerations of the Bennett AmendWage Discrimination, supra note 1, at 465.
See part II supra.
'"' 563 F.2d 353 (8th Cir. 1977). Christensen is not cited in the text of Wage Discrimination (though it is cited in the footnotes, see Wage Discrimination, supra note 1, at 489
n.327 & 495 n.345), no doubt because the case was predicated on a Title VII job comparability theory of wage discrimination that Professor Blumrosen seeks to distinguish from a
wage discrimination theory predicated upon job segregation.
The EEOC submitted an amicus brief in Christensen, taking the position that the university's maintenance of wage disparities between male and female jobs that it knew
were of equal value amounted to unlawful discrimination under Title VII because (1 l the
university was aware that the wage disparities in the labor market were largely the result
of societal discrimination, and (2) the university made no attempt to determine the extent to which the wage differentials were justified by economic factors or required by
business necessity.
20

•

•

05

286

Journal of Law Reform

[VOL. 13:2

ment's applicability, 207 plaintiffs had failed to establish a prima
facie case under Title VII because they had not shown that "the
difference in wages paid to clerical workers and plant employees
rested on sex discrimination and not on some other legitimate
reason." 208 The evidence established that the employer paid
higher wages to plant workers because higher wages were paid
for such work in the local labor market. 209
The Christensen court noted the plaintiffs' attempt to fit their
complaint to the disparate impact method of proof. 210 The court
then decisively rejected this theory on the basis that Title VII
does not apply to wage scales at all. Title VII, Christensen holds,
is directed at equal·. employment opportunities, not equal
wages. 211
In a second recent federal court decision, Lemons v. City and
County of Denver, 212 the court held that the city had not violated
Title VII despite the plaintiffs' contention that the defendants
paid nurses, a female-dominated profession, less than it paid
other employees for work of comparable value in male-domi207 The Christensen court explicitly left the Bennett Amendment issue unresolved. If
the court had held that the Bennett Amendment applied, the plaintiffs would have had
to demonstrate that the work of the clerical and plant workers was "substantially equal"
in order to make out a prima facie case under Title Vll.
zoa Christensen v. Iowa, 563 F.2d 353, 355 (8th Cir. 1977).
The decision in Christensen could equally well have been reached on an alternative
ground that the court did not discuss. Even if the plaintiffs' evidence met the disparate
impact criteria for a prima facie case, the employer rebutted that case by showing that
its actions were required by business necessity. In a free market economy, the necessity
to hold costs, including wages, down to those mandated by the market is the most pressing business necessity of all, the sine qua non of business survival.
ZIii The court stated:
Appellants' theory ignores economic realities. The value of the job to the employer represents but one factor affecting wages. Other factors may include the
supply of workers willing to do the job and the ability of the workers to band
together to bargain collectively for higher wages. We find nothing in the text and
history of Title VIl suggesting that Congress intended to abrogate the laws of
supply and demand or other economic principles that determine wage rates for
various kinds of work. We do not interpret Title VIl as requiring an employer to
ignore the market in setting wage rates for genuinely different work
classifications.
Id. at 356.
21
• Appellants contend the [defendant] UNl's policy violates Title VII by perpetuating wage differences resulting from past discrimination. . . . [The contention
is that] UNI's reliance in part on prevailing wage rates in determining beginning
pay scales for jobs of equal worth to the university serves to carry over the effects
of sex discrimination in the marketplace into the wage policies of the college.
Id. at 355-56.
211 Id. at 356. Judge Miller disagreed with this basis of the court's opinion, but concurred because he found the Bennett Amendment applicable. Id. at 357 (concurring
opinion).
212
17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 906 (D. Colo. 1978), alf'd DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), No. 81
at D-1 (10th Cir. April 24, 1980).
-
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nated occupations. As in Christensen, the court stated that there
had been no showing of wage differentials based directly or indirectly on sex discrimination except insofar as historical discrimination had created a lower pay scale for certain occupations traditionally performed by women. The court found that the city
had simply relied on market forces in setting its pay scales. 213
The court had grave misgivings concerning an approach to wage
discrimination that ignored labor market economics, stating:
"Congress cannot, and never has been able, to repeal the law of
supply and demand. And the situation, unfortunate that it may
be, is that the supply of nurses is very large compared to the
demand, and it puts the nurses in a somewhat disadvantageous
negotiating position. " 214
It should be noted that even in Gunther v. County of Washington, 215 an appellate decision supporting the argument that the
Bennett Amendment incorporates only the four affirmative defenses of the EPA into Title VII and that, therefore, a Title VII
wage discrimination claim may be asserted when the pay differential is not between "substantially equal" jobs, the burden to
demonstrate· sex discrimination remained on the plaintiff. The
court held that on remand plaintiffs should have an opportunity
to show that "some of the discrepancy in wages was due to sex
•
discrimination. " 216
These cases uniformly have held that the burden of proof is
upon the plaintiffs in Title VII compensation cases to establish a
prima facie case that an inequality in pay is based upon sex discrimination. Even more important, Christensen and Lemons emphatically indicate that the local labor market may be considered by the employer in setting wage rates. In the words of the
Christensen court, to ignore such market rates "ignores economic
realities. " 211
m Id. at 913.
'" Id. at 909. As Chief Judge Winner perceived the issue in Lemons, the acceptance of
the plaintiffs' view that Title VII can reach wage discrimination not actionable under the
EPA wo_uld open "the Pandora's box of restructuring the entire economy of the United
States of America." Id.
"' 602 F.2d 882 (9th Cir. 1979).
"' Id. at 888, 894.
m Christensen v. Iowa, 563 F.2d 353, 356 (8th Cir. 1977). Wage Discrimination cites
Coming Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188 (1974), for the proposition that the market
rate or "community wage structure" is not a defense to a Title VII wage discrimination
claim. Wage Discrimination, supra note 1, at 488-89. The citation is inapposite. Corning
Glass did not involve Title VII at all, but rather the EPA, and in that case the employer
attempted to use "market price" as a defense for its practice of paying women Jess than
men for substantially the same job. This was the very evil that the EPA was designed to
remedy. The courts have Jong held that market forces will not justify a wage inequality
when men's and women's jobs are substantially equal in job content. See, e.g., Hodgson
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THE CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE

Congress could, if it chose to do so, enlarge the EPA or Title
VII to include "comparable worth." The law would then require
that all "men's" and "women's" jobs be paid identically except
for pay differences proportionate to the relative "worth" of jobs.
By incorporating the comparable worth theory into the law, Congress would be mandating an entire scale of relative wages, leaving to the courts the formidable task of spelling out the details.
This section will set forth several reasons why such- a statute
would be unwise.

A.

The Measurability of Wage Discrimination

Professor Blumrosen has argued that the courts should adapt
remedial statutes such as Title VII "to address those problems
which come newly into focus. " 218 The converse is no less true: the
courts - and Congress - should refrain from attempting to address alleged problems that cannot be brought into focus. Despite Professor Blumrosen's exposition, wage discrimination remains an amorphous theory and an unmeasurable concept. We
have explained in part I why it appears that wage discrimination
cannot be dissected from other and legitimate sources of wage
differentials. Even if advances in economic theory might someday change the situation, the experts agree that the necessary
analytif al methodology does not exist today. 219
This is not the familiar problem of evaluating a damage that
is by nature imprecise: the courts cope well enough with even
such inexact quantities as the value of life itself. The problem
with wage discrimination is of another magnitude altogether.
Residual wage differentials could arise in part from wage discrimination, but they also could - and at least in part do arise from other causes. 220 Any statute that attempted to require
the courts to discern and measure such indeterminate quantities
would only mire our legal machinery in judicial quicksand.
v. Brookhaven Gen. Hosp., 436 F.2d 719 (5th Cir. 1970). The touchstone of the EPA is
job content: when it is the same for men and women, market rates are irrelevant. But see
Horner v. Mary Institute, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), No. 13, at A-4 (8th Cir. Jan. 18, 1980),
in which the court stated in dictum that, if the plaintiff had shown that her job was
substantially equal to that of a male colleague, his higher salary would still have been
justified by his greater value in the job market.
118 Wage Discrimination, supra note 1, at 502.
m See Kahne & Kohen, supra note 81, at 1258-61, who acknowledge that economic
theory and analysis of male-female wage differentials are in a state of disarray. See also
J. MADDEN, supra note 72, at 20-23; and Aigner & Cain, supra note 125, at 187-88.
zzo See part I supra.
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Equitable Enforcement of the Comparble Worth Theory

The difficulty becomes apparent as soon as one descends from
the abstractions of theory to outline how comparable worth theory could be applied to the realities of a wage structure. Suppose, .for example, that a bias-free, universal job evaluation system has been developed and · has been applied to the wage
structures of the Shady Dell and Moderne nursing homes:
FIGURE

2

Shady Dell

Modeme

Job Evaluation
System Points

Job
Title

Sex

Salary

Sex

Salary

40

gardener

M

$8,000

M

$7,250

attendant

F

8,000

F

8,000

80

nurse

F

16,000

F

14,500

90

administrator

M

17,000

F

14,995

physician

M

40,000

50
60

70

100

If Title VII were amended to incorporate the comparable worth

theory, to what salaries would the female employees be entitled?
If "comparable" means "equal," they presumably would not be
entitled to relief under Title Vll: no male job is equal in "worth"
(job evaluation systems points) to a female job. Suppose, then,
that "comparable" is given a more expansive meaning: male and
female jobs must be paid in proportion to their point value in
the job evaluation system.
Shady Dell's nurses file suit for an injunction to raise their salary from the present $16,000 to $32,000, their rightful proportion
(80%) of the physicians' salary. The nursing home owner argues
that the nurses are fairly paid: their job is "worth" twice as
much as the (male) gardeners' job and is paid proportionately
more, $16,000 as compared with $8,000. Further, the employer argues, the job most nearly comparable to the nurses' in "worth" is
the administrators' job. Administrators are "worth" one-eighth
more than nurses but earn only one-sixteenth more. Meanwhile,
the attendants demand $24,000 (60% of the physicians' salary),
and the employer must pay them that amount, or at least
$12,000 (150% of the gardeners' salary), or $11,333 (66-2/3% of
the administrators' salary) or something in between. Comparable
worth theorists have not discussed which "male" jobs would be
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used for comparison purposes. It would take the wisdom of Solomon to solve this conundrum. But even Solomon could not do
equity as between Shady Dell and Moderne. Moderne has .no
physicians on its staff; it contracts out for their services. Its
nurses have no comparable worth claim, for they are paid twice
as much as Moderne's only male employees, the gardeners, and
their job is "worth" twice as much. Moderne's attendants, however, do have a claim: their job is "worth" 50% more than the
gardeners', so perhaps they will have to be paid $10,875.
If the outcome is that Shady Dell must pay its nurses $32,000
and Moderne must pay its attendants $10,875, a further development is reasonably foreseeable. Shady Dell and Moderne will
likely succumb to competitors that contract out for the services
· of physicians and gardeners. 221
The difficulty of doing equity by mathematics at the hypothetical Shady Dell and Moderne would be far more complicated and still more impossible - in the far more complex real world.

C.

Financial Burdens on Government and Business

1. Direct costs - Among the direct costs of comparable
worth theory would be the regulatory expenses of agencies in the
Executive Branch, expenses of the courts, and litigation costs of
employers and employees. These costs would be a great deal
larger than for Title VII because Professor Blumrosen's proposed
standard of proof would give a winning case to the great majority
of all female employees. 222 Employers would also bear the consid221
For examples of analogous actual developments in the equal pay area, see Glucklich, Hall, Povall & Snell, Equal Pay: Time to Go Back to the Drawing Board, 9 PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT 16 (No. 1 January 1977).
m See part ill supra. Moreover, an employer's potential liability under a Title VII
wage discrimination action would, in most cases, be far greater than under a corresponding Title VII-EPA wage claim, which requires that a plaintiff demonstrate a prims facie
case under EPA standards. For example, assume that a large manufacturing enterprise,
which encompasses several plants located in a dozen states, faces a class action liability
under Professor Blumrosen's theory that it has underpaid clerical employees, who are
primarily women, on a company-wide basis. Under the Blumrosen approach to Title VII
job comparability, the plaintiffs could seek damages for wage discrimination on a company-wide basis. However, under the existing Title VII-equal pay cases, the plaintiffs
would be restricted by the EPA's standards, which require a plaintiff to demonstrate that
a wage differential existed for equal work within the same establishment. Orr v. Frank R.
McNeill & Son, Inc., 511 F.2d 166, 170-71 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 865 (1975).
But see Wetzel v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 449 F. Supp. 397, 16 Empl. Prac. Dec.~ 8343
(W.D. Pa. 1978) ("establishment" requirement of EPA not a limitation on Title VIIequal pay claims). Because a Title VII wage discrimination case under Professor Blumrosen's theory would no longer be circumscribed by any EPA standards - including the
establishment requirment - an employer's potential liability would be explosively
expanded.
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erable cost of installing and maintaining job evaluation systems.
2. Indirect costs - One of the largest costs of the comparable
worth theory would be a distortion of the economy as employers
struggle to pay market rates rather than rates dictated by a universal job evaluation system. Adoption of the comparable worth
theory would not relieve employers of the constraints of the
market. The costs of raw materials and capital and the prices that
could be charged would still depend on market forces. Employers
would, of course, attempt to find loopholes through which they
could pay market prices for labor. The history of the Internal
Revenue Code is instructive in this respect. The efflorescing of
section upon section, the piling of regulation upon regulation, is
largely the natural result of taxpayers' ingenuity in finding ways to
comply with the letter of the law while avoiding the taxes that the
law intended to impose. Some of the tactics for avoiding
comparable worth theory are outlined below:
a. Export of jobs. Large numbers of "women's" jobs are suitable for export. Clothing, for example, can be manufactured as
readily in Hong Kong and Seoul as in New York City. This is
why the union with the highest proportion of female members of
any major union, the International Ladies Garment Workers
Union, is so vehemently opposed to the comparable worth movement. The president of that union has stated: "I'll be damned if
I know a way to get the women more money . . . . The value of
their work isn't set by theoretical principles but on the value of
the work in the marketplace and in the face of competition from
overseas, where garment workers make 30 cents an hour." 223
b. Contracting out. Businesses already contract out for services whose wage structures fit awkwardly with the primary enterprise. For example, many businesses contract for the services
of attorneys and physicians at the high end of the scale, and for
food service workers and janitorial services at the low end. Contracting out large numbers of traditionally "female" or "male"
jobs would be expensive, both for the individual enterprise and
for the economy as a whole. For a company faced with enormously increased labor costs, however, even large sacrifices in ef- ·
ficiency would be economically attractive. Consider, for exampl~,
an appliance retailer who employs office workers, a sales force,
and repairmen. Almost all the office workers are female; almost
all the others are male. Assume that Congress had adopted the
comparable worth theory and mandated the use of a job evalua223
Address by S. Chaikin, President, ILGWU, AFL-CIO Annual Convention, Washington, D.C. (Nov. 15-20, 1979), quoted in The New Pay Push for Women, Bus. WEEK, Dec.
17, 1979, at 69.
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tion sy.stem developed by the NAS as the standard by which
"worth" must be assessed. According to this system, the "worth"
of the salesmen is forty-three percent more than that of the office
workers, and the "worth" of the repairmen is twenty-seven percent more than that of the office workers. The company has been
paying both salesmen and repairmen ninety percent more than
office workers.
The company is in a dilemma. It cannot afford to raise the
office workers' salaries as high as the job evaluation system mandates, because the profit margins in its business are too low. It
cannot cut the men's salaries, both because the law prohibits it
and because the market value of the men's skills would enable
them to move to the greener pastures of self-employment or
other employment rather than take large pay cuts. In the long
run it is likely that the salesmen and the repairmen will move to
independent, self-employed jobs, or will organize themselves in
business enterprises which are too small to come under the jurisdiction of Title Vll, or which consist of all male repairmen and/
or all male salesmen. These men will then be able to earn "market" recompense for their efforts. Such an atomized fragmentation of business organizations is probably quite inefficient and
would raise the costs of goods and services to the entire society.
c. Overturning congressional determination of the minimum
wage. Setting the minimum wage rate requires a balancing of
competing considerations. 22• The balancing of complex, unquantifiable factors is the sort of decision-making that is best suited
to the legislature, not the judiciary. To a large extent, Professor
Blumrosen's proposal would take the minimum wage decision
away from Congress and the states. For affected occupations, the
courts would be required to set the wages, and to decide without
reference to the many legitimate factors that economists and interest groups place before national and state legislatures. 225 Inzu The interests affected by the minimum wage are far more complex than those of
employers versus workers. Increases in minimum wages benefit not only low-wage employees, but also medium-wage employers, who are freed of competition from low-wage
employers. Some low-wage employees benefit from higher wages, but others suffer recurrent or even permanent unemployment, as their jobs are lost to automation, imported
goods, and/or illegal alien workers. See, e.g., C. STEWART, JR., Low-WAGE WORKERS IN AN
AFFLUENT SOCIETY (1974); Falconer, The Minimum Wage: A Perspective, 3 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK or NEW YORK QUARTERLY R.Ev. 3 (Autumn 1978); Kosters & Welch, The Effects of Minimum Wages by Race, Sex, and Age, in RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN ECONOMIC
LIFE, supra note 80, at 103; Moore, The Effect of Minimum Wages on Teenage Unemployment Rates, 79 J. PoL. EcoN. 897 (1971); Weintraub, A Comment on Regional Differentials in the Differential Between Nonwhite and White Unemployment Rates, 79 J. PoL.
ECON. 200 (1971).
111 See, e.g., L. WEINER, FEDERAL WAGE AND HOUR LAW 14-19 (1977), for a discussion of
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stead, the courts would have to set wages according to inferences
from abstract theory.
The occupations affected would be those that are female-intensive and are paid at or near the minimum wage. A number of
such jobs, employing many thousands of people, are likely to be
among those affected by comparable worth theory. 228 Wages set
by reference to only one factor - comparable worth - would
likely be much further from the optimum than wages set by legislative bodies, which are free to attend to all factors. 227
Illegal immigration is one example of the serious problems
that would be exacerbated if minimum wages were set by a comparable worth theory formula rather than by legislative decision.
The higher the minimum wage, the more displacement of legal
workers by illegal aliens. This is no mere marginal problem; for
example, an estimated sixty to seventy percent of garment workers employed in the United States are illegal aliens. 228 If garment
worker minimum wages are raised by application of comparable
worth theory, it is logical to expect that still more citizens and
legal aliens will be replaced by illegal aliens. 229
d. lnfiation. Implementation of comparable worth theory
would increase the wages of many women, but it would not increase productivity at all. The result would be massive inflation. 230 Excessive inflation harms the entire economy by encouraging immediate consumption at the expense of savings and
the policy and purposes of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219
(1976) (FLSA), the principal federal statute prescribing minimum wage and overtime
coverage. With respect to both minimum wage and overtime, the FLSA contains a complex array of industry exemptions. Id. at 109-45.
m Jobs likely to be affected include garment trades, entry level clerical jobs, food service workers, and hospital and nursing home attendants. See, e.g., M. WITI' & P.
NAHERNY, WOMEN'S WoRIC - UP FROM .878 (Univ. of Wis. Extension, Madison 1975).
227
Congress cannot satisfy all the diverse interests, but it can take many interests into
account in setting minimum wages. The comparable worth theory would take account of
,w interests, but would operate on the basis of its theory alone.
m AFL-C/0 Adamant Against Illegal Aliens, S. F. Chronicle, Feb. 26, 1980, at 23, col.
1.

m Illegal aliens impose substantial costs on the economy. Some of the most important
costs, such as welfare payments to unemployed legal residents who are displaced, are
difficult to estimate. At least one cost item can be determined: the cost of apprehending
and expelling illegal immigrants. The Immigration and Naturalization Service expelled
1,430,902 illegal aliens in 1977 alone, an activity that must have cost a very substantial
amount. CONGRESSIONAL REsEARCH SERVICE, U.S. IMMIGRATION LAw AND POLICY 1952-1979
at 34, Table 2 (1979).
= It has been estimated that the total dollar amount required annually to achieve pay
parity between full-time working women and men in the United States would be $150
billion. Smith, supra note 134, at 58-59. The addition of this staggering sum to employee
wages would generate an enormous inflationary reaction within the economy.
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investment. 231

D.

The Effect of the Comparable Worth Theory on Women

The inflationary consequences of implementation of the comparable worth theory would affect different groups unequally.
Women working in traditionally female jobs would be 'protected,
provided their employers also have traditionally male jobs and
fill them with men. The comparable worth law would raise such
women's wages. These women's husbands and children would
also benefit, as would their ex-spouses. 232 But other groups, probably including the large majority of women, would suffer di~proportionate losses of purchasing power. These groups include:
most married women and their dependents, for the majority of
married women are not employed outside the home; 233 all nonemployed single women and their dependents (especially
mothers on welfare to the extent that welfare allowances lag behind inflation); all non-employed widows and retired women; 234
all women working in traditionally "mixed" jobs and in traditionally "men's". jobs; and all women working in traditionally
"women's" jobs, but in all-female work forces, e.g., nursery
schools and child care centers, or for employers too small to be
covered by Title VII. This last group includes the most poorly
paid of all employees, private household workers.
Thus, the· income redistributed by comparable worth theory
would flow mainly to single women and to families without
young children. The additional real income to those groups
would be taken largely from families in which one or more
women were not working because of age, illness, or the need to
care for young children. We doubt that a convincing case could
be made that such a redistribution of real income would be beneficial to the nation as a whole.
P. SAMUELSON, supra note 46, at 273.
Former husbands would benefit from reductions in the need for child support and
alimony.
m In May 1979, 46.4% of married women were employed, 2.1% were unemployed, and
51.6% were not in the labor force. U.S. DEP'T or LABOR, WOMEN IN THE LABOR FORCE:·
SOME NEW DATA SERIES 5, Table 6 (Report No. 575, 1979). But see 102 L.R.R.M. 98
(1979) (prediction that by 1990 "the stereotype of the wife as one who stays home with
the children will apply to about a quarter of all married women," citing THE SUBTLE
REVOLUTION: WOMEN AT WoRIC (H. Barrett ed. 1979)).
2" Widowers, retired men, and the wives of retired men would also suffer a loss of
purchasing power, but because of women's longer life span, the group of older persons is
primarily female. Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707
(1978) ("(W]omen, as a class, do live longer than men").
231

232
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The Effect of the Comparable Worth Theory on Job
Integration

The ultimate goal of Title VII is the achievement of equality of
employment opportunities. 235 This goal is attainable in the workplace only through job integration. The adoption of a comparable worth appraoch to wage discrimination would inhibit, perhaps even imperil, the attainment of job integration.
The legislative histories of Title VII and its 1972 amendments
demonstrate that Congress' principal motivation for the enactment of these statutes was to remedy pervasive exclusionary discrimination in employment, especially against blacks. 238 The primary intent of Congress was to end job segregation or, more
broadly stated, to end the segregation of employment opportunities.237 With respect to sex discrimination, Congress was chiefly,
and almost exclusively, concerned with the problem of job segregation resulting from discrimination in hiring, promotion, recruitment, and job assignment. For example, the Senate Report
reviewing the administration of the sex discrimination provisions
of Title VII during the enactment of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972238 stated: "Despite the large increase in the
numbers of women in the work force, women continue to be relegated to low paying positions and are precluded from high paying executive positions. Similarly, the rate of advancement for
women is slower than for men in similar positions. " 239 The House
Report echoed the same concern: "Women are subject to economic deprivation as a class. Their self-fulfillment and development is frustrated because of their sex. Numerous studies have
shown that women are placed in the less challenging, the less
235
"The objective of Congress in the enactment of Title VII is plain from the language
of the statute. It was to achieve equality of employment opportunities . . . . " Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429 (1971).
231
110 CONG. REC. 6548 (1964)(remarks of Senator Humphrey); id. at 7204-05 (remarks
of Senator Clark); United Steelworkers of America v. Weber,_ U.S.-, 99 S. Ct. 2721,
2729 (1979).
237 110 CONG. REc. 6547-48 (1964) (remarks of Senator Humphrey); id. at 6552 (remarks
of Senator Kennedy). See also Blumrosen, The Duty of Fair Recruitment Under the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 22 RUTGERS L. REv. 465 (1968), in which Professor Alfred Blumrosen,
who is the husband of the author of Wage Discrimination, stated: "Discrimination in
recruitment and hiring is the chief measurable evil against which the modem law of employment discrimination is directed . . . . The elimination of minority differential in unemployment rates will be a true signal that equal employment opportunity does in fact
exist." Id. at 465-66.
"' 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-16 (1976).
231
S. REP. No. 92-415, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY AcT OF 1972 at 416 (Comm. Print 1972) [hereinafter
cited as LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF EEO).
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responsible and the less remunerative positions on the basis of
their sex alone." 240
The legislative record is bereft of any reference to comparable
worth or wage discrimination, so Professor Blumrosen's assertion
that Congress dealt with wage discrimination as one of the "discriminatory radiations of job segregation" 241 has no basis in fact.
Instead, the legislative focus was upon job segregation itself and
the removal of discriminatory barriers barring women from more
challenging, responsible, and remunerative positions.
A comparable worth approach to residual wage differentials
would not bring our society closer to the goal of job integration.
Such an approach would quash perhaps the most powerful incentive for women to enter occupations historically held by men:
the prospect of higher pay. If employers are required to pay
higher wages for traditional "women's" jobs, women holding
those jobs will have substantially less incentive to become pioneers in integrating the predominantly male jobs. Almost certainly the result would be a decrease in the movement of women
into "men's" jobs.
Another and even more deleterious consequence of the implementation of comparable worth theory is the fact that it would
give employers large incentives to segregate their work forces.
Under a comparable worth theory, particularly under Professor
Blumrosen's variant, 242 it is impossible for an employer to know
whether or not it is in compliance with Title VII. Even the most
well-intentioned of employers would face substantial liability in
"comparable worth" back pay awards. The necessity of remaining competitive in the marketplace would spawn employer
avoidance techniques. In order to reduce the uncertainty of compliance and minimize exposure to large damage awards, as well
as compete in the marketplace, employers would seek to escape
comparable worth problems by contracting out work. In many
cases the subcontractors would be single-sex organizations that
would not be affected by Title VII wage discrimination
liability. 243
No. 92-238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
EEO, supra note 239, at 64.
"' Wage Discrimination, supra note 1, at 465.
"' Under Professor Blumrosen's theory, employers would be virtually precluded from a
defense of pay differentials on the basis that the differences reflect the external labor
market or that they conform to an internal job evaluation system. See text accompanying
notes 188-89 supra.
3
"
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1976). Under this section of Title VII "(i)t shall not be
an unlawful employment practice for an employer to apply different standards of compensation . . . to employees who work at different locations . . . . " Because this section
"" H.R. REP.
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Finally, Professor Blumrosen's approach would inhibit job integration by imposing liability on those employers who actively
pursued job integration as well as on those who did not. 244 Employers then surely would neglect their affirmative action and
equal employment opportunity efforts because they would see
that no matter how much financial investment they made, they
would still face very large liabilities.

F.

Existing Remedies

Rejection of the comparable worth theory by no means implies
acceptance of wage discrimination. The statute books already
contain a formidable armamentarium of laws whose impacts are
reducing the wage differentials between the sexes. The EPA 245
and many similar state statutes246 prohibit the most direct form
of sex discrimination in wages, unequal pay for equal work. Substantial awards have been granted under the EPA, 247 and its effects spread far beyond the cases that have gone to judgment. As
with most statutes, cases that go to trial are only a small fraction of the cases that are settled, and the cases that are settled
are only a fraction of the cases that might have been brought
were it not for widespread voluntary compliance with the law.
The EPA does not reach allegations of wage discrimination involving dissimilar jobs, but Title VII and similar state statutes
in the large majority of states are powerful indirect forces against
restricts Title VII's application to one "location" of a single employer, it is implausible
that Congress intended Title VII wage comparisons to be made between different employers at different locations.
2
"
The employer who brought men into what had been "women's" jobs would be no
less liable than the employer who maintained a segregated work force. Wage Discrimination, supra note 1, at 498-99. Nor could the employer decrease its liability by increasing
the wage for the traditional women's job. Under the Wage Discrimination presumption,
the mere fact of a job that is or was female-intensive creates an inference of illegal wage
discrimination-no matter what wage the employer actually pays. See text accompanying notes 183-84 supra.
m 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1976).
"' Thirty-seven states presently have statutes, similar to the EPA, proscribing unequal
pay for equal work. SA FAIR EMPL. PRAc. MAN. (BNA) 499, 503 (1980). See, e.g., CAL. LAB.
CODE § 1197.5 (Deering Supp. 1979).
"' See, e.g., 2 EQUAL EMPLOYER (FED.) ,r 2 (Jan. 2, 1978) (Smith College agreed to pay
$136,000 in back wages to 143 female custodial emplo~ees in settlement of EPA action
brought by the Department of Labor (DOL)); 1 EQUAL EMPLOYER (FED.) ,r 297 (Aug. 29,
1977) (Iowa school district agreed to settle EPA action filed by DOL on behalf of 27
women custodial employees for "over $100,000"); 1 EQUAL EMPLOYER (FED.) ,r 147 (Apr.
25, 1977) (Cambridge, Massachusetts, settled DOL-initiated EPA cases involving 283
present and former nurse's aides for $257,000 in back wages).
During the fiscal year ending September 20, 1979, the DOL recovered $10.3 million in
settlements and awards in EPA cases. 102 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 290 (1979). The DOL
statistics do not include amounts recovered in private EPA actions.
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wage discrimination. These anti-job-segregation statutes protect
workers' rights to integrate traditionally single-sex jobs. Since
wage discrimination cannot survive the end of job separation,
the integration of the workforce means the end of such wage discrimination as may exist. The force of Title VII is augmented by
Executive Order No. 11,246 and its amendments 248 and its many
state and municipal analogs, together with associated regulations and guidelines. 249 These laws place the weight of federal
and state regulatory authority behind job integration; they use
the power to withhold government contracts to impel employers
to action; and they require employers to take the initiative to
integrate their workforces. As with many governmental regulatory activities (or for that matter, private regulatory activities),
the enforcement of Executive Order No. 11,246 has been uneven
in vigor and effectiveness. But recent events make it clear that
Executive Order No. 11,246 is no paper tiger. 250 The goals of governmental regulation are more likely to be achieved by improving the internal efficiency of the enforcement agencies than by
generating entirely new responsibilities, together with the corresponding multiplication of rules, regulations, guidelines, and
procedures, 251 for the agencies and courts.
'" Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 1964-1965 Comp. 339 (1967), reprinted in 42
U.S.C. § 2000e app., at 1232 (1976), as amended by Exec. Order No. 11,375, 3 C.F.R.
1966-1970 Comp. 684 (1971) and Exec. Order No. 11,478, 3 C.F.R. 1966-1970 Comp. 803
(1971).
'" See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. §§ 1600.735-1643.707 (1979) (EEOC rules and regulations), 8
CAL. ADMIN. CoDE §§ 295-296.4 (rules and regulations of California Fair Employment
Practices Commission) (1979).
,.. For example, on June 28, 1979, Uniroyal, Inc., was debarred by the OFCCP and
declared ineligible to receive government contracts or subcontracts. 3 EQUAL EMPLOYER
(FED.) ,r 270 (July 16, 1979). Uniroyal is the largest firm to date to be debarred because of
discrimination under Exec. Order No. 11,246. At the time it was cut off from new government business, Uniroyal had more than $36 million in federal government contracts. Uniroyal subsequently agreed to settle its debarment case by paying $5.2 million to 750 female current and former employees and restoring their pension and seniority status. This
backpay award is the largest settlement in such a case since 1973, when American Telephone & Telegraph Co. agreed to pay $52 million. Under the terms of the Uniroyal settlement, the OFCCP agreed to reinstate Uniroyal as an eligible government contractor. 3
EQUAL EMPLOYER (FED.) ,r 445 (Nov. 5, 1979); 102 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 178 (1979). Uniroyal was the eighth government contractor to be debarred during the past two years for
violating the requirements of Exec. Order No. 11,246. In April 1979, the Labor Department debarred Loffland Brothers Co., one of the world's largest oil drilling companies, for
failing to maintain an affirmative action plan pursuant to its responsibilities as a government contractor under Exec. Order No. 11,246. 3 EQUAL EMPLOYER (FED.) ,r 178 (May 7,
1979) .
.., The feminist economist Francine Blau has made recommendations for more effective enforcement of sex discrimination law. F. BLAU, EQUAL PAY IN THE OFFICE 108-11
(1977). Her recommendations, based on a very detailed statistical analysis, are for deployment of enforcement resources in the "traditional" areas of hiring and promotion. Id.
at 103-04. Blau's analyses show that it is in hiring and promotion, and not in equal pay,
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In response to these considerations, supporters of the comparable worth idea say that the law as it is does not work: they claim
that jobs remain largely segregated and that the wages of women
and minorities are not rising. 252 The first part of this response is a
non sequitur, for sex segregation in the workplace is already a
prime focus of Title VII, and no new force against sex segregation would be created by implementation of the comparable
worth idea. Indeed, comparable worth would tend to inhibit the
movement of women into non-traditional jobs. 253
The argument that the relative wages of minorities and women
are not increasing is mistaken. Wages of blacks relative to those
of whites have risen in recent years, and the relative wages of
black women have risen more than those of any other group in
American society for whom figures are available. 254 For women
generally, both black and white, the proportion of women intraditionally male jobs increased greatly in the 1970's. 255 Although
that the major problem resides. Id. at 24, 103-04. Like most economists, Blau does not
even discuss wage discrimination in the sense that Professor Blumrosen uses the term.
Blau points out that inefficient patterns of enforcement have serious consequences:
[T)he current structure appears to militate against uniform and timely enforcement of the law. Under the present system, it is possible that some employers
will be deluged by investigators from different agencies, subjected to conflicting
compliance requirements, and forced to defend themselves against the same discrimination charge in a seemingly endless number of forums. Other employers
(one suspects the majority) may not be subjected to any serious pressure to conform to the antidiscrimination statutes and regulations. At the same time, victims of discrimination languish as their complaints remain unprocessed.
Id. at 107.
•n Wage Discrimination, supra note 1, at 402-415. See address by EEOC Commissioner
J. Clay Smith, supra note 9, at E-2.
253
See part m supra.
"" Between 1960 and 1970,
[b]lack female hourly earnings, adjusted for age and schooling, rose 82 percent
compared with 68 percent for black males and 53 percent for white females. By
1969, hourly earnings of black females were only 15 percent less than those of
white females of comparable age and schooling, while for women with more than
twelve years of schooling the adjusted color differential had practically
disappeared.
Fuchs, Women's Earnings: Recent Trends and Long-Run Prospects, MONTHLY LAe. REv.,
May 1974, at 23 .
... For example, between 1970 and 1978, the proportion of accountants who are women
rose from 25.3% to 30.1%, a 19% increase; for engineers the corresponding increase was
75%; for lawyers and judges, 100%; physicians and osteopaths, 27%; and nonfarm managerial-administrative officials, 41%. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, WoMEN IN THE LABOR FoRcE: SOME NEW DATA, SERIES 3 at Table 4 (Report No. 575, 1979). One indirect but
impressive index of women's rising status in business is the recent increase in airline
business travel by women. In 1979, business travel by women accounted for 17% of all
U.S. airline revenue from business travel, an increase from 13% in 1977 and from only 1%
in 1974. Women Travelers Find Safety and Harassment Can be Major Problems, Wall St.
J., March 5, 1980, at 1, col. 1. The progress shown in these figures contrasts with the
stasis conveyed by the statistics cited in Wage Discrimination because that article is
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the overall ratio of fem ale to male earnings has remained almost
constant, in recent years that ratio has been maintained in the
face of a very large influx of women entering the labor force for
the first time. After adjustments for the temporarily large proportion of new women workers, the relative wages of women have
risen. 258
Thus, changes are occurring in the status and the wages of
women and minorities. No doubt Title VII and the EPA have
contributed to those changes. But such changes are of a magp.itude much greater than can be attributed to the law alone. If the
fundamental arrangements within human society - arrangements such as the institution of the family itself and the division
of labor within the family - are of glacial solidity, it is apparent
that late in the twentieth century the United States is experiencing an increasingly rapid thaw of the glacier. With or without
comparable worth theory, the rationalizations for discrimination
against women in the workplace are moribund. Implementation
of Professor Blumrosen's drastic remedies would do little to
hasten those epochal changes in our society. Rather, the result
would be enormous inflationary stresses on the economy, with
attendant real losses for the majority of women as well as men. 257
CONCLUSION

This article has demonstrated that wage differences between
different jobs performed by men and women are not subject to
the remedial framework of Title VII. The argument that a Title
VII remedy should be judicially mandated because wage discrimination is an inevitable consequence of the sexual or racial identification of particular occupations should be rejected for two
principal reasons. First, no evidence exists that residual wage
differentials resulting from discrimination can be detected or
quantified by any present social science technique. Second, no
basis exists under equal employment opportunity statutes or
case law for such a remedy.
This article has asserted that not only the courts but also Congress should refrain from fashioning a "comparable worth" approach to wage differentials. The adoption of a comparable
almost entirely based on older statistics. The changes in the period 1970-1978 generally
were greater than in the entire period 1950-1970. Id .
... For example, in the 1960's the female-male earnings ration for whites, adjusted for
hours, age, and schooling, increased by 4.8%. Fuchs, supra note 254, at 23. See Economic
Report of the President, 1974, quoted in MONTHLY LAB. REV., May 1974, at 22.
257
See part III supra.
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worth theory would result in inequitable enforcement, impose
crushing economic burdens upon employers and the economy as
a whole, reduce the real incomes of more women than it would
benefit, and impede the attainment of the ultimate goals of
equal employment opportunity.

